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The core contribution is a critique of signaling theory from investigating cooperative 
signaling behavior in the context of organizational engagement with open source projects. 
Open source projects display signals of project health which are used by organizations. 
Projects and organizations engage in cooperative signaling behavior when they work 
together to create signals. Signaling theory is critiqued in the cooperative context of 
organizational engagements with open source projects by describing how cooperative 
signaling behavior occurs in three processes: identifying, evaluating, and filtering new 
signals. The contribution is informed through engaged field research and interviews, 
which are presented as a thick description of the CHAOSS Diversity & Inclusion 
Working Group and of how its community members create D&I signals. A contribution 
to literature on open source is a description of how signals for open source project health 
are created.  
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PROJECT HEALTH 
 
By  
Georg John Peter Link 
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1 Introduction 
Open source project health is the potential that an open source project will 
continue developing quality software (Naparat, Finnegan, & Cahalane, 2015). A problem 
with assessing open source project health is that it is a hidden quality, which can only be 
inferred from signals (Ho & Rai, 2017). Organizations form an opinion of project health 
to make decisions about engaging with open source projects (Linåker, Regnell, & 
Damian, 2019; Link & Germonprez, 2018). Research shows that organizations do not 
know which of many different signals are effective when assessing open source project 
health (Crowston, Howison, & Annabi, 2006; Goldman & Gabriel, 2005; Ihara, Monden, 
& Matsumoto, 2014; Schweik & English, 2012). An unawareness about what signals are 
important reduces an organization’s ability to clearly identify risks involved in 
organizational engagements with open source projects (Germonprez, et al., 2017), 
including the risk of project health failures.  
Consequences of project health failures can have significant impacts, 
considering the widespread use of open source software. For example, the Heartbleed 
vulnerability existed in the open source software library OpenSSL, which was maintained 
by two community members who did not earn a living from this important work (Eghbal, 
2016). The lack of funding for development served as a signal when considering that a 
majority of servers worldwide used OpenSSL to secure internet connections (Durumeric 
et al., 2014). As a consequence of not observing and acting on this signal, organizations 
risked compromising sensitive information. As another example, the Struts/Equifax data 
breach (Sally, 2017) demonstrated that organizations are at risk when they do not act 
 3 
based on open source project health signals. Apache Struts had announced a release with 
a security fix (a positive signal), but Equifax did not act on this signal, failing to secure 
its server infrastructure (Sally, 2017). As a result, hundreds of millions of people had 
their personal information compromised.  
The commonality between these cases is that organizations leveraged open 
source software without paying attention to signals of project health. After these project 
health examples, the realization spread that signals of open source project health are not 
well understood (Danes, 2017). The question of which signals open source projects and 
organizations should display and use was even raised by lawmakers. For example, the 
United States Congress sent a letter to the Linux Foundation, asking how open source 
project health failures can be avoided in the future (Walden & Harper, 2018). In another 
example, the EU-Free and Open Source Software Auditing project systematically creates 
an inventory of open source software used by European institutions and compares 
relevant signals for project health (European Commission, n.d.). These examples 
demonstrate that finding effective signals of project health in an effort to limit the risk 
and impacts of project health failures is an increasingly important issue for open source 
projects and organizations. 
We know that signals are used for assessing open source project health (Ho & 
Rai, 2017; Linåker et al., 2019; Link & Germonprez, 2018) and that projects have many 
signals to choose from (Crowston et al., 2006; Schweik & English, 2012). Open source 
projects can choose which signals to display and influence how organizations perceive 
them (Spence, 1974) and projects have an incentive to appear healthy to organizations 
because it increases the chance that organizations start contributing to the project (Bacon, 
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2012; Fogel, 2015). How projects strategically display signals can be observed in practice 
with the Hyperledger project. In a press release, the Hyperledger project signaled that it 
had a vibrant community by displaying the number of developers and companies who 
contributed to its latest release.
1
 Thereby, Hyperledger signaled to organizations that the 
project had wide industry support and had the potential to meet organizational needs in 
the future, both considerations of open source project health.  
Literature on signaling theory provides evidence for how signals are used 
when information is unevenly distributed (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), but 
does not provide a definitive answer for how to identify effective signals. Studies on 
multiple signals are inconclusive regarding how signals interact with each other and what 
makes one set of signals more effective than another (Drover, Wood, & Corbett, 2017; 
Miyazaki, Grewal, & Goodstein, 2005). Signaling literature treats sender and observer 
choices for which signals to display and use as non-cooperative (Connelly et al., 2011).  
However, open source is inherently cooperative. Open source projects and 
organizations have been shown to cooperatively work on such things as standards that 
facilitate their interactions (Gandhi, Germonprez, & Link, 2018) and code bases that 
define their outputs (Wright & Druta, 2014). Similarly, projects and organizations may 
cooperate to overcome challenges of signaling open source project health. Therefore, the 
cooperative space of open source provides a good context in which to critique signaling 
theory as more than a non-cooperative endeavor. 
                                                 
 
1 Hyperledger did this in announcing Fabric 1.0: https://www.hyperledger.org/announcements/2017/07/11/hyperledger-
announces-production-ready-hyperledger-fabric-1-0 
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 Spence (1974) speculated that senders and observers can benefit from 
working together to overcome signaling challenges and to create signals. However, 
Spence (1974) did not empirically explore this speculation. As such, I explore senders 
and observers collaboratively creating signals in open source, an inherently cooperative 
context. As projects and organizations engage in cooperative signaling behavior to create 
signals, it presents a research opportunity to critique signaling theory (Mathiassen, 
Chiasson, & Germonprez, 2012) and shed light on how signals are cooperatively created. 
The cooperative creation of signals is not well documented, because literature 
investigates signaling in non-cooperative settings to evaluate effects of existing signals 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Hence, the goal of this study is to investigate how signals are 
created through cooperative signaling behavior. To reveal this complexity and to critique 
signaling theory, the following research question guides this research:  
 
RQ: How do open source projects and organizations create signals for open 
source project health? 
 
Beyond theoretical contributions, the question of how open source projects 
and organizations create signals of open source project health is a timely applied topic. 
Open source projects and organizations benefit from an investigation of complexities 
involved in assessing open source project health. Specifically, open source program 
officers, open source foundation members, and open source project members can better 
inform their engagement decisions through signals by understanding how open source 
project health signals are created. 
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2 Literature Review: Open Source 
An open source project encompasses open source software and a community 
that develops the software. For software to be open source, it must be licensed under an 
open source license. Open source software licenses build on the copyright system and 
grant anyone permission to use, modify, and distribute the software without restrictions. 
The Open Source Initiative
2
 is an industry collaboration to check licenses for these 
attributes. 
When open source emerged, it was a social movement, and the idea that 
volunteer communities could develop software that competed with commercial software 
intrigued researchers (Aksulu & Wade, 2010; Kelty, 2008; Stallman, 1983; von Krogh & 
von Hippel, 2006; Weber, 2004). We learned what motivated contributors to participate 
in open source (Von Krogh et al., 2012), how open source projects were organized 
(Mockus, Fielding, & Herbsleb, 2002), and that there is more to open source than the 
production of software (Aksulu & Wade, 2010).  
From the many streams of open source research (Aksulu & Wade, 2010), the 
one stream most relevant to my research discussed implications that emerging open 
source practices may have on organizations and on software economics (Benkler, 2002, 
2013; Lerner & Tirole, 2002). Empirical studies focused on individual companies and 
investigated the basics of how organizations engaged with open source projects 
(Bonaccorsi, Giannangeli, & Rossi, 2006; Chan, 2013; Dahlander, 2005; Dahlander & 
                                                 
 
2 https://opensource.org/licenses/ 
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Magnusson, 2005; Dahlander & Wallin, 2006). As more organizations began to embrace 
open source as a software development method, research conceptualized the implications 
that organizational engagement has for open source projects (Feller, Finnegan, Fitzgerald, 
& Hayes, 2008; Fitzgerald, 2006; Germonprez, Kendall, et al., 2013; Kelty, 2013). While 
organizations have engaged with open source projects for a long time, much has changed 
since this earlier work (Germonprez, Link, Lumbard, & Goggins, 2018). 
The emergence of organizational engagement as a phenomenon can be 
observed in the evolution of the Linux Foundation, which was founded in 2000 by 
organizations that were using the Linux Kernel and contributing to its development. The 
initial goal was to provide a stable home for the Linux Kernel project, pay Linus Torvalds 
to oversee the development, and promote the project. After building experience and 
expertise with brokering open source projects, the Linux Foundation expanded its focus 
“to help establish, build, and sustain some of the most critical open source technologies.”3 
By 2015, the Linux Foundation hosted about 15 collaborative projects. Since then, the 
number of projects increased to over 150 at the start of 2019.
4
 These projects advance 
strategically important but non-differentiating technologies that organizations develop 
together, including the Linux Kernel project for advancing an operating system, the 
Kubernetes project for advancing container orchestration software, and the Hyperledger 
project for advancing blockchain technology. Today, the Linux Foundation is a trade 
organization with more than 1,300 paying member organizations. On average, a new 
member joined the Linux Foundation every day in 2017 and 2018, doubling memberships 
                                                 
 
3 https://www.linuxfoundation.org/about/ 
4 https://www.linuxfoundation.org/projects/ 
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in only two years and demonstrating that organizational engagement with open source 
projects is on the rise (Zemlin, 2019).  
An increase in organizational engagement with open source projects raises 
new research questions and opens new streams of research (Germonprez et al., 2018; 
Link & Jeske, 2017). While not fully comprehensive of the organizational engagement 
research landscape, research has come to hone in on five categories presented by 
Germonprez et al. (2018), which will be discussed in following sub-sections (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Stream of research categories relevant to organizational engagement with open source 
projects (Germonprez et al., 2018). 
Category Description Section 
Conceptual Research on organizations engaging with open source projects. 2.1 
Production Research on issues related to producing open source projects. 2.2 
Legal and Regulatory Research on legal and regulatory issues, especially as they pertain to 
open source licenses. 
2.3 
Adoption and 
Implementation 
Research on how developed software and practices become adopted 
and implemented. 
2.4 
Performance Metrics Research on how open source project development can be understood 
through metrics. 
2.5 
 
2.1 Conceptual: Organizational Engagements 
Organizational engagements are exchanges between for-profit organizations 
and open source projects. Open source projects provide a platform for organizations who 
are otherwise competitors to engaged in a shared advancement of non-differentiating 
technologies (Germonprez, Allen, Warner, Hill, & McClements, 2013). Open source 
community members have a shared goal to advance the software and self-organize 
necessary activities (Kelty, 2008). Shared community goals can align with organizational 
goals, for example, to solve a technical challenge like building a reliable operating 
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system. Organizations are attracted to projects where goals align, which can facilitate 
whether an organization chooses to become a member in an open source project (Linåker 
et al., 2019; Link & Jeske, 2017). 
Because membership in open source projects is tied to people engaging in the 
community, organizations are increasingly initiating organizational engagements by 
directing employees to participate in open source projects in pursuit of organizational 
goals (Dahlander & Wallin, 2006; Linåker et al., 2019). The level to which an individual 
organization engages with open source projects and practices can be observed in 
employees’ involvement, the level of transparency a company maintains for internal 
software development, and the degree to which internal software development practices 
are similar to open source development practices (Link, Gill, & Khazanchi, 2017). 
The level of organizational engagement with open source projects varies 
between open source projects though it is increasing in many cases. Today, about half of 
open source development is paid work (Riehle, Riemer, Kolassa, & Schmidt, 2014) and 
some projects are dominated by organizational employees (Kelty, 2013). The increase in 
organizational engagement results from several large organizations, such as Oracle, IBM, 
and Red Hat, realizing how open source benefits their business model and publicly 
championing its use (Weber, 2004). The trend is evident in a 2016 survey which reported 
that 65% of responding organizations actively contributed to open source projects and 
intended to increase their contributions (Black Duck Software, 2016).  
Organizational engagement can take several forms (Linåker et al., 2019). 
When an organization uses open source software in organizational innovation processes 
(Dahlander, 2005; Germonprez et al., 2017; Levy & Germonprez, 2015), it may choose to 
 10 
only use open source software without contributing back (Dahlander, 2005). However, 
engaging in a project and learning through contributing can yield better business results 
(Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Nagle, 2018). Organizations engage with open source projects to 
collaborate with outside experts (Germonprez, Allen, et al., 2013), where shared 
innovation remains in a public space for everyone to benefit (von Hippel & von Krogh, 
2003). Engaging with an open source project is also beneficial because organizational 
changes to open source software are difficult to maintain locally within an organization 
and are best maintained in the original open source project (Ramsauer, Lohmann, & 
Mauerer, 2016). Engaging with open source projects and influencing the development 
requires organizational representation and a good standing of employees within open 
source projects (Linåker et al., 2019). Employees who have a good standing in an open 
source project are more likely to influence the project in ways that are beneficial for their 
employer (Dahlander & Wallin, 2006). 
Organizational engagements can benefit from having an open source 
foundation that provides financial, legal, administrative, and technical support (Riehle, 
2010). Foundations provide a legal home for open source projects and serve as a fiscal 
sponsor. Foundations shape the way open source projects operate and the way 
organizations engage with projects (Link & Germonprez, 2016). The additional support 
structures and the use of proven governance models make projects more reliable for 
organizations to use in their innovation streams (Germonprez, Kendall, et al., 2013).  
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Table 2. Summary of select literature on the conceptual understanding of organizational 
engagement with open source projects. 
Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
von Hippel & von 
Krogh, 2003 
Theoretical discussion of organizational engagement with open source projects 
making the case for research into how innovation is done in open source projects. 
Weber, 2004 
Book on the basics of open source and what may result from an increase of 
organizational engagement with open source projects. 
Dahlander, 2005 
Empirical analysis of five organizations and their different approaches to engaging 
with open source projects. 
Bonaccorsi et al., 
2006 
Empirical analysis of strategies of organizations that engage with open source 
projects shows that engaging with open source projects yields benefits. 
Dahlander & 
Wallin, 2006 
Empirical analysis of how organizational employees engage with open source 
projects showing that organizations have more influence in an open source project 
if their employees have a good standing with the project community. 
Kelty, 2008 
Book on the history and workings of open source showing that open source 
projects self-organize their activities. 
Riehle, 2010 
Theoretical discussion of organizational engagement with open source arguing that 
foundations provide value in these engagements. 
Germonprez, 
Allen et al., 2013 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with the open source project 
OpenMAMA showing that otherwise competing organizations work together to 
develop non-differentiating technology in open source projects. 
Germonprez, 
Kendall, et al., 
2013 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with open source projects 
showing that open source projects are stabilizing their practices in response to 
organizational needs. 
Kelty, 2013 
Position paper about the increasing influence of organizational engagements on 
open source projects proposing that open source as a social movement was 
replaced by open source as a collaboration model for organizations. 
Riehle et al., 2014 
Empirical analysis of contributions to open source projects concluding that a about 
half of all contributions result from organizational engagement with open source 
projects. 
Levy & 
Germonprez, 2015 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with open source projects 
showing how organizations innovate in open source projects. 
Black Duck 
Software, 2016 
Industry survey of organizations and their engagement with open source projects 
showing an increase in organizations engaging with open source projects. 
Link & 
Germonprez, 2016 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with open source projects 
showing that relationships between open source projects and organizations are 
influenced and shaped by open source foundations. 
Ramsauer et al., 
2016 
Method development for analyzing patch stacks that organizations maintain when 
modifying open source projects without contributing changes upstream showing 
that maintaining a local patch stack is more work than maintaining changes in the 
open source project. 
Germonprez et al., 
2017 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with open source projects 
showing how open source projects and organizations enable productive 
interactions. 
Link & Jeske, 
2017 
Theoretical discussion of organizational engagement with open source projects 
providing potential streams of research and research questions. 
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Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
Link et al., 2017 
Survey development for evaluating the level of open source practices adoption in 
an organization showing ways to assess how engaged organizations are with open 
source projects. 
Nagle, 2018 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with open source projects 
showing that organizations get more value from open source projects when 
engaging with them compared to only using open source software. 
Linåker et al., 
2019 
Empirical analysis of decisions that organizations make when engaging with open 
source project showing that organizations can strategically select how to engage 
with open source project to further business goals by gaining influence. 
 
2.2 Production: Financing Open Source Work 
How open source projects work and create software has been well-researched 
(Aksulu & Wade, 2010). Processes in open source projects are adjusting to organizational 
engagement (Fitzgerald, 2006; Germonprez et al., 2017). With increasing organizational 
engagement, an increasing number of contributors are paid for producing open source 
software (Kelty, 2013; Riehle et al., 2014). However, paying contributors is at odds with 
the original conception of open source that neither considered monetary exchanges nor 
was designed for them (Benkler, 2002; Kelty, 2013; Stallman, 1983). As a result, open 
source contributors and project maintainers struggle to sustain a living from their work in 
open source (Eghbal, 2016). Simultaneously, organizations like Red Hat, IBM, Microsoft, 
Facebook, and Google capture value created in open source projects and turn that value 
into profits. Organizations leverage open source software, a communal artifact, in 
developing services and products (Germonprez et al., 2017). In 2018, mergers and 
acquisitions, private equity, and initial public offerings for organizations that leveraged 
open source for their core product exceeded $70 billion USD (Zemlin, 2019), which 
demonstrates that financial resources are available for work in open source.  
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Open source projects, organizations, and foundations have realized that open 
source projects are not healthy if they rely on contributors and maintainers who subsidize 
their work on open source software by working unrelated jobs (Eghbal, 2016). From this 
realization, many funding platforms have been created.
5
 The Core Infrastructure 
Initiative
6
 (CII), for example, looks for open source projects that are widely used but do 
not have a sustainable financial foundation. One of the first projects CII provided 
financial support for was the OpenSSL library, which then conducted a security audit and 
fixed vulnerabilities in response to Heartbleed. A variety of other initiatives propose 
different mechanisms for funding open source work, including the following examples. 
At the task level, GitCoin
7
 is a blockchain solution through which contributors can get 
paid for working on specific issues from people who are willing to pay for issues. 
Bountysource
8
 allows donations for specific features that contributors can develop to 
claim the money. Hackerone
9
 is a platform where funding is specifically tied to finding 
and fixing software vulnerabilities in open source. At the project level, OpenCollective
10
 
is a platform that provides fiscal sponsorship to projects with a transparent ledger to 
provide trust in how projects use donated money. CommunityBridge
11
 is a platform that 
integrates fiscal sponsorship, with mentorship and vulnerability inspection. Finally, 
TideLift
12
 is a company that sells assurances to its clients for open source projects they 
                                                 
 
5 As of March 13, 2019, http://oss.fund/ lists 44 funding platforms. 
6 https://www.coreinfrastructure.org/ 
7 https://gitcoin.co/ 
8 https://www.bountysource.com/ 
9 https://www.hackerone.com/ 
10 https://opencollective.com/ 
11 https://communitybridge.org/ 
12 https://tidelift.com/ 
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rely on. TideLift then pays maintainers in those projects and works with them to ensure 
the health of these projects. 
Many of these initiatives assume that financial support must be given to 
volunteer contributors, which raises concerns about increasing financial incentives to 
work in open source and inadvertently changing the dynamics in open source projects 
(Hansson, 2013). Experiments of paying contributors have caused concern in established 
open source project communities (Gerlach, Wu, Cunningham, & Young, 2016). However, 
research finds that paying volunteers does not diminish intrinsic motivations but rather 
increases volunteers’ contribution activity (Fiorillo, 2011; Roberts, Hann, & Slaughter, 
2006). In many open source projects, community members are already paid for their 
work because it is part of their job (Kelty, 2013; Riehle et al., 2014) and resources 
available to open source projects are important in the production of open source software 
(Arantes & Freire, 2011). 
Research aims to understand incentives and compensation of contributors as 
they align with values and ideals of open source projects in light of increasing 
organizational engagement (Rao, Link, Marti, Leak, & Bodo, 2018). New forms of 
structuring financial incentives for software development have been theorized to 
incentivize the creation of secure software (Rao, Parkes, Seltzer, & Bacon, 2015). 
Reimagining how work in open source can be financed has the potential to lead to 
healthier projects, new forms of work, and changing the market dynamics around open 
source projects (Link, Rao, Marti, Leak, & Bodo, 2019). 
 
 15 
Table 3. Summary of select literature on the production of open source software in the context of 
organizational engagement with open source projects, specifically issues of financing open 
source work. 
Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
Stallman, 1983 
Announcement of the GNU Project which resembles a historic 
document in the social movement for free software from which open 
source has developed. 
Benkler, 2002 
Theoretical analysis of open source as a coordination mechanism in 
comparison to organizations and markets showing that open source 
excels at coordinating creative work by allowing contributors to self-
select work without supervisor directive (organizational coordination) 
or financial incentives (market coordination). 
Fitzgerald, 2006 
Theoretical discussion of organizational engagements with open 
source projects showing that projects adjust their processes to 
accommodate organizational needs. 
Roberts et al., 2006 
Empirical analysis of open source project contributor motivations 
showing that paying contributors increases their level of contribution. 
Aksulu & Wade, 2010 
Comprehensive review and synthesis of open source research 
providing an overview of research streams. 
Arantes & Freire, 2011 
Literature overview about open source project health showing that 
resources are important for open source project health. 
Fiorillo, 2011 
Empirical analysis of financial incentives on intrinsic motivations in 
volunteer settings showing that intrinsically motivated volunteers 
continue increase their effort when receiving financial incentives. 
Hansson, 2013 
Blog post about concerns for introducing payment for open source 
work arguing that financial incentives will change dynamics in open 
source projects. 
Kelty, 2013 
Position paper about the increasing influence of organizational 
engagements on open source projects proposing that open source as a 
social movement was replaced by open source as a collaboration 
model for organizations as more contributors are paid employees. 
Riehle et al., 2014 
Empirical analysis of contributions to open source projects 
concluding that a about half of all contributions result from 
organizational engagement with open source projects. 
Rao et al., 2015 
Theoretical development of financial incentives for deep fixes for 
software bugs arguing that financial incentives can be designed to 
align with values for quality software. 
Eghbal, 2016 
Industry report about the state of open source project health across 
projects showing that projects are unhealthy if they depend on 
maintainers who subsidize their unpaid open source work. 
Gerlach et al., 2016 
Empirical analysis of community responses to the introduction of 
payment for release managers in the all-volunteer Debian open source 
project showing that paying volunteer contributors is a contentious 
issue in open source projects. 
Germonprez et al., 2017 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with open source 
projects showing that organizations incorporate open source software 
in their innovation streams. 
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Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
Rao et al., 2018 
Theoretical introduction of a novel market design arguing that 
financial incentives can be designed to strengthen open source project 
health and facilitate organizational engagement in open source. 
Link et al., 2019 
Theoretical discussion of Rao et al.’s (2018) market design 
implications for open source projects arguing that a market could 
improve project health, create new forms of work, and change 
existing market dynamics. 
Zemlin, 2019 
Keynote at Open Source Leadership Summit 2019 showing that 
organizations engaged with open source projects for their core 
product collected $70 billion USD through M&A/PE/IPO in 2018. 
 
2.3 Legal and Regulatory: Compliance  
Organizational engagement with open source projects includes legal and 
regulatory issues regarding compliance with open source licenses (Germonprez et al., 
2012). License compliance is important because organizations that are believed to violate 
open source license obligations face the risk of law suits (Wen, Forman, & Graham, 
2013). Especially as open source projects have grown to be complex and containing 
different licenses, complying with license obligations has become more challenging 
(Alspaugh, Scacchi, & Asuncion, 2010). With license compliance as a major concern for 
organizations (Ihara, 2014), surveys confirm that organizations adopt necessary policies. 
The IT consultancy Gartner found in 2008 that 31% of the companies surveyed had 
formal policies for evaluating or cataloging use of open source software in their 
organization (Kemp, 2010). In 2016, the company Black Duck found that 50% of 
organizations had formal policies (Black Duck Software, 2016). While not fully deployed 
across industry, these surveys demonstrate that organizations are building and adopting 
policies and processes for managing risk involved with engaging with open source 
projects. Specifically, organizations mitigate risks from licenses through trained people, 
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strategies, policies, and processes for tracking the use of open source software and their 
license obligations (Kemp, 2010). Some organizations have dedicated open source 
program offices that make decisions about compliance (Germonprez et al., 2012).  
License compliance is important also for open source projects because a 
lawsuit reduces use of and contribution activity within an involved project (Wen et al., 
2013). With incentives for open source projects and organizations to avoid lawsuits, 
projects and organizations work together to develop standards and best practices for 
license compliance (Gandhi et al., 2018; Germonprez et al., 2012). Specifically, open 
source projects and organizations engaged in the SPDX
13
 open source project developed 
the “SPDX-License-Identifier” as a standard and machine-readable way to explicate 
license obligations within open source software source code. The SPDX project created a 
specification for a document that expresses license obligations of an open source software 
and can be exchanged alongside the software (Gandhi et al., 2018). In another effort, the 
OpenChain
14
 open source project is developing best practices for organizations to make 
license compliance more consistent across organizations. Organizations can be certified 
for following these best practices, which includes having a policy on accepted licenses, 
having trainings about licensing for employees, and documenting procedures for 
identifying and tracking open source components and their license obligations. Both 
examples demonstrate that best practices for compliance are not developed only in open 
source projects or organizations but are negotiated in organizational engagements with 
open source projects (Germonprez et al., 2012). 
                                                 
 
13 https://spdx.org/ 
14 https://www.openchainproject.org/ 
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Organizations that use the open source model to develop software have 
several licensing options (Lerner and Tirole, 2002). Without engaging with open source 
projects, organizations can use open source software development practices internal to 
the organization to develop proprietary software, which does not require license 
compliance if kept separate (Sen, Subramaniam, & Nelson, 2011; Stol & Fitzgerald, 
2015). When releasing internally developed software, organizations can choose a license 
that supports their business model (Shahrivar, Elahi, Hassanzadeh, & Montazer, 2018). In 
addition to purely proprietary or purely open source licenses, organizations can dual-
license their software. For example, a free “community edition” can have an open source 
license and a paid “commercial edition” can have a proprietary license, but only the latter 
is accompanied with access to support and assurances (Shahrivar et al., 2018). Regardless 
of the license, organizations can maintain full control over the software development 
even if using the open source development model (Mulligan et al., 2011). However, an 
open source license is beneficial if the goal is to build a community that will advance 
software together (Feller et al., 2008) and in these cases, organizations prefer non-
copyleft licenses that permit advancing the software without having to publicly release 
changes (Gamalielsson & Lundell, 2017). 
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Table 4. Summary of select literature on legal and regulatory issues in the context of 
organizational engagement with open source projects, specifically how open source projects and 
organization develop new methods for license compliance. 
Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
Lerner & Tirole, 
2002 
Theoretical discussion of the economics of open source software arguing that 
organizations may choose licenses in response to economic incentives. 
Feller et al., 2008 
Empirical analysis of how organizations collaborate to produce software arguing 
that collaborative creation of software is enabled by open source licenses. 
Alspaugh et al., 
2010 
Theoretical discussion of license obligations in open source projects that have 
multiple open source licenses showing that some license obligations are 
incompatible. 
Kemp, 2010 
Theoretical discussion of organizational strategies, policies, and processes for 
engaging with open source projects arguing that license compliance needs to be 
integrated in how organizations engage with open source projects. 
Mulligan et al., 
2011 
Empirical analysis of how organizations engage in the Android open source project 
uncovering that control is not surrendered with the open source license. 
Sen et al., 2011 Empirical analysis of license choice in open source projects showing that goals of 
open source projects are correlated with their license choice. 
Germonprez et al., 
2012 
Empirical analysis of compliance practices in open source projects showing that 
projects and organizations shape compliance practices together. 
Wen et al., 2013 
Empirical analysis of lawsuits for suspected violations of open source license 
obligations and their effect on open source projects showing that lawsuits reduce 
use of open source projects and reduce levels of developer activity. 
Ihara, 2014 
Theoretical discussion of industry questions that emerged from a survey of 
organizations showing that license concerns are prevalent for organizations 
engaging with open source projects. 
Stol & Fitzgerald, 
2015 
Theoretical discussion of organizations using open source software development 
practices internally showing how license compliance is different when engaging 
with open source projects versus working internal to organization only. 
Black Duck 
Software, 2016 
Industry survey of organizations and their engagement with open source projects 
showing that only about half of surveyed organizations have formal policies for 
engaging with open source projects. 
Gamalielsson & 
Lundell, 2017 
Empirical analysis of license obligations in widely used open source projects 
showing a difference in license obligations for foundation supported open source 
projects compared to community established open source projects. 
Gandhi et al., 
2018 
Empirical analysis of the SPDX standard for conveying license obligations in open 
source projects showing how open source projects and organizations developed the 
standard together. 
Shahrivar et al., 
2018 
Literature overview of business models for open source software showing that 
organizations have different license strategies. 
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2.4 Adoption and Implementation: Standard Setting 
An important aspect related to the adoption and implementation of open 
source software developed in organizational engagements with open source projects is 
how it shapes industry practices (Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002). Organizational 
engagement with open source projects not only creates shared software but also shared 
best practices that get distributed across projects and organizations (Gandhi et al., 2018). 
Because open source projects have the potential to establish industry standards, 
organizations have to understand this process as it is different from standard setting 
through committees (Mulligan, 2008). 
Research found that open source projects tend to develop standards because 
of the coordination mechanisms used within projects (Egyedi & Van Wendel de Joode, 
2004). The rationale is that changing open source software would hurt users who depend 
on the software. In striving towards stability, open source projects establish unchanging 
and de-facto standard interfaces for users and applications (Egyedi & Van Wendel de 
Joode, 2004). It was therefore suggested that the open source development model could 
be applied to formal standard setting (Mulligan, 2008).  
Standard setting has long been researched, showing that standards influence 
practice, have strategic meaning for organizations, involve power struggles, and are 
subject to institutional forces (Aggarwal, Dai, & Walden, 2011; Backhouse, Hsu, & Silva, 
2006; Casile & Davis-Blake, 2002; Grøtnes, 2009; Hicks & Goronzy, 1966; Leiponen, 
2008). Organizations invest in standard setting because influencing standards and 
learning from the discussions to create standards has economic benefits (Hurd & Isaak, 
2005). Standards are either formally defined through standard-setting organizations or 
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implicitly through strong market players (Backhouse et al., 2006). Standard setting 
through open source projects can involve many different organizations and outcomes 
become industry standards when they have support from strong market players (Mulligan, 
2008; Mulligan et al., 2011). This may be evolving as the European Commission is 
evaluating the role that open source projects can play in future standard setting 
approaches in the European Union (European Commission, 2018). Specifically, the 
European Commission is gathering experience reports from organizational engagements 
with open source projects about how software and practices from those projects have 
become de-facto standards in industry.  
Elevating open source projects to the rank of official standard setting 
organization has the appeal of modernizing standard setting practices based on open 
source project practices (Mulligan, 2008). Specifically, benefits are believed to include 
improved ways to collect feedback from potential users and greater acceptance of 
standards because a larger community can be involved in the standard-setting process 
(ibid.). Potential risks for developing standards in open source projects stem from 
licenses and patents (ibid.). As solutions for these risks are advanced, companies are 
becoming more comfortable with the idea of developing standards through open source 
projects (Wright & Druta, 2014).  
Open source projects ensure that standards are practical by innovating 
standard specifications alongside implementations (Wright & Druta, 2014). Innovation 
for specification and implementation stem from experience reports and feature requests 
as community members adopt a standard to their local contexts (Gandhi et al., 2018). 
Resulting from these discussions, standard setting in open source projects not only 
 22 
produces standard specifications but also best practices for using and adopting standards 
(ibid.). The distribution of standards therefore not only involves standard specifications, 
but also best practices as learned and shared within open source projects. 
 
Table 5. Summary of select literature on the adoption and implementation of open source 
software in the context of organizational engagement with open source projects, specifically how 
it is evident in standard setting. 
Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
Hicks & Goronzy, 
1966 
Theoretical discussion of how standard setting influences practice showing that 
standard setting has long been studied. 
Casile & Davis-
Blake, 2002 
Empirical analysis of how organizations respond to technical and institutional 
changes in standards, showing that standard setting has been studied in 
organizational contexts. 
Egyedi & Van 
Wendel de Joode, 
2004 
Theoretical discussion of how open source project employs coordination 
mechanisms that lead to standardization arguing that standard setting is an inherent 
process to open source projects. 
Hurd & Isaak, 
2005 
Theoretical discussion of incentives for different stakeholders to engage in 
standard setting showing that organizations have economic incentives. 
Backhouse et al., 
2006 
Empirical analysis of power and politics in standard setting showing that 
organizations are influenced by exogenous contingencies and institutional forces 
when engaging in standard setting. 
Leiponen, 2008 
Empirical analysis of cooperative standard setting in a traditional consortium 
format revealing strategic considerations that organizations have for influencing 
standard setting. 
Mulligan, 2008 
Theoretical discussion of how open source practices can be used to modernize 
standard setting in the IT context showing potential benefits and risks for 
organizations. 
Grøtnes, 2009 
Empirical analysis of one standard setting consortium in the IT sector and its 
organizational choices showing how standard setting can occur outside of open 
source projects. 
Aggarwal et al., 
2011 
Empirical analysis of the relationship between number of organizations engaged in 
standard setting and risks resulting for these organizations showing that 
organizations can reduce risks by engaging more organizations in standard setting. 
Mulligan et al., 
2011 
Empirical analysis of how organizations engage in or are impacted by standard 
setting in the Android open source project uncovering complexities in setting 
standards in open source projects. 
Wright & Druta, 
2014 
Theoretical discussion of open source projects as industry alliances that 
organizations can leverage to improve standard setting arguing that the software-
driven approach in open source projects validates standard implementations sooner 
than in a more traditional specification-driven standard setting approach. 
European 
Commission, 2018 
Website about the European Commission project for evaluating open source 
projects as a means for standard setting showing that legislators are investigating 
the potential benefits of setting industry standards in open source projects 
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Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
Gandhi et al., 
2018 
Empirical analysis of an industry standard as developed through organizational 
engagement with open source projects showing that standard setting in open source 
projects creates best practices for using a standard in addition to the standard. 
 
2.5 Performance Metrics: Open Source Project Health 
Organizations are looking to performance metrics as signals for open source 
project health when making decisions about engaging with open source projects (Link & 
Germonprez, 2018). Before organizations engage with open source projects, they have to 
compare organizational engagement to alternative means of software development (e.g., 
in-house development, outsourcing, or purchasing commercial solutions) for achieving 
business goals (Fitzgerald, 2006). A major concern for organizations that enter into a 
dependency with open source projects is whether an open source project will be reliable 
and around for the long term (Germonprez et al., 2017).  
As defined earlier, open source project health is the potential that an open 
source project will continue developing quality software (Naparat et al., 2015). This 
definition has three components. First, it takes a long-term perspective in which future 
development is sustainable. Second, it requires an outcome of an ongoing development 
efforts. Third, it accommodates that a potential of a future is the closest we can assess 
because the future cannot be known ahead of time. It may be difficult to know whether a 
project is healthy but easier to identify whether a project is not healthy. Loss of 
contributors and poor code quality are two prominently recognized signals that indicate a 
lack of project health (Marsan et al., 2019). 
 24 
Literature points to three dimensions along which open source project health 
can be assessed: (1) community, (2) code, and (3) resources (Arantes & Freire, 2011; 
Link & Germonprez, 2018). The Community dimension captures that open source 
projects rely on people to contribute. Relevant signals include diversity of community 
members, size of community, and governance of community. The Code dimension 
captures that open source projects should produce quality software. Relevant signals 
include vulnerabilities, quality of code, and activity in collaboration tools (Decan, Mens, 
& Constantinou, 2018; Khomh et al. 2014). The Resources dimension captures that open 
source projects can develop quality software using their own resources, including an 
infrastructure of specialized hardware, continuous integration systems, testing facilities, 
and financial resources. Relevant signals include availability of resources, number of 
sources providing resources, and how resources are managed within a project. Each of 
these dimensions focuses on a different aspect of open source project health and can be 
understood through a variety of signals (Crowston et al., 2006). 
Many signals are used to assess open source project health (Head, 2016). 
Which signals for each dimension of open source project health should be assessed is not 
well understood. Related research used a quantitative perspective, calculated open source 
project signals, and correlated them with continued development or discontinuation of a 
project (Crowston et al., 2006; Schweik & English, 2012). Vetted signals based on past 
development activity and no study made or validated predictions about the future success 
of projects. Another challenge with these signals is that they are based on readily 
available metadata about an open source project which cannot account for the quality of 
an activity that produced the metadata.  
 25 
From an applied perspective, practitioners find it useful to specify goals for 
assessing open source project health and to combine them with personal knowledge about 
an open source project in determining which signals best signal health and answer 
specific questions (Bacon, 2012; Izquierdo, 2017). This added qualitative foundation 
counters a problem of unintentionally misunderstanding signals, which are known to 
carry different meanings across open source projects (Vancsa, 2018). Because personal 
experience is important in choosing signals for assessing open source project health, a 
common method for assessing open source project health is missing (Link & Germonprez, 
2018). A related unsolved challenge is to assess the health of a project’s ecosystem, 
which includes dependencies (Marsan et al., 2019). Ecosystem health is important in light 
of increasing complexity as open source projects build on other projects, introducing 
dependencies not only in code but also in health. The SECO Health project is working to 
understand these inter-project dependencies and their related health dynamics (Decan, 
Mens, & Grosjean, 2019). 
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Table 6. Summary of select literature on performance metrics in the context of organizational 
engagement with open source projects, specifically how they inform open source project health. 
Select Literature Summary of how literature is relevant 
Crowston et al., 
2006 
Empirical analysis of historical open source project data showing how different 
signals can be operationalized and how they relate to open source project health. 
Fitzgerald, 2006 
Theoretical discussion of organizational engagements with open source showing 
that organizations are strategic about engaging with open source projects. 
Arantes & Freire, 
2011 
Literature overview about open source project health showing that open source 
project health can be observed through signals pertaining to community, code, and 
resources. 
Bacon, 2012 
Book about community management showing that using metrics to understand an 
open source project requires first knowing what questions about the project need to 
be answered. 
Schweik & 
English, 2012 
Book with empirical analysis of what factors lead to open source project health 
showing correlations between past activity data and whether a project was 
abandoned or continued to release software. 
Khomh et al. 2014 
Empirical analysis of signals related to software quality showing that activity in 
collaboration tools are signals for software quality. 
Naparat et al., 
2015 
Empirical analysis of what mechanisms in organizational engagements with open 
source projects that influence open source projects health providing a definition of 
open source project health. 
Head 2016 
Empirical analysis of what signals developers pay attention to when choosing open 
source projects showing that many signals exist. 
Germonprez et al., 
2017 
Empirical analysis of organizational engagement with open source projects 
showing that organizations integrate open source projects in their innovation 
streams. 
Izquierdo, 2017 
Blog post about defining a metric strategy open source projects showing that signal 
selection is dependent on the goals and questions of an organization. 
Decan et al., 2018 
Empirical analysis of vulnerabilities in open source projects showing that healthy 
projects address vulnerabilities quickly. 
Link & 
Germonprez, 2018 
Empirical study about how open source project health is assessed in organizational 
engagements with open source projects showing that there is no common method 
for assessing project health. 
Vancsa, 2018 
Blog post about challenges with using metrics to understand open source project 
health. 
Decan et al., 2019 
Empirical analysis of dependencies between open source projects showing that the 
SECO Health project is focusing on health dynamics that span many projects. 
Marsan et al., 
2019 
Empirical analysis of open source ecosystem health problems and their causes 
showing what the most common health problems are. 
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3 Literature Review: Signaling Theory in the Context of Open Source 
Stemming from literature, signaling theory enables a theoretical examination 
at how performance metrics play a role in the evolving nature of organizational 
engagement with open source projects. Signaling theory informs situations where an 
informational structure is asymmetric for senders and observers, and signals are used to 
overcome the asymmetry (Connelly et al., 2011; Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Spence, 1974). 
The information asymmetry exists with regard to a sender’s hidden quality. Signaling 
occurs often before a sender and an observer engage and before an observer could learn 
about the true nature of a sender’s hidden qualities. Signaling continues throughout an 
engagement when an observer cannot fully rely on experience to learn the hidden quality 
(Ho & Rai, 2017). Signaling theory describes that signals allow observers to differentiate 
between senders of high and low hidden qualities, but signals can also help coordinate 
collaborating senders and observers (Hasson, 1997). Senders can purposely display 
signals to shape the informational structure, thereby influencing observers (Spence, 1974). 
Signaling theory has been applied in settings where organizations send signals to 
employees (Karanges, Johnston, Lings, & Beatson, 2018), consumers (Erdem, 1998), and 
other organizations (Heil & Robertson, 1991). Open source projects are known to signal 
to volunteer members and influence their intention of continued participation (Ho & Rai, 
2017).  
Organizational members are not directly able to observe the health of an open 
source project but rely on signals. Literature on open source software adoption found that 
signals influence organizations’ decisions when engaging with open source projects 
 28 
(Dedrick & West, 2003; Nagy, Yassin, & Bhattacherjee, 2010; Poba-Nzaou, Raymond, & 
Fabi, 2014). Signals are meaningful as open source projects and organizations use them 
in their engagement even though open source projects can send signals without being 
aware of it (Ho & Rai, 2017; Santana, 2014). Open source projects benefit from 
intentionally displaying signals because it may attract additional organizations who help 
further the project (Bacon, 2012). Organizations benefit from using signals about open 
source project health because it informs decision-making (Heil & Robertson, 1991). 
3.1 Signaling Activities 
Displaying credible signals is important for open source projects in 
communicating with organizations (Fogel, 2015). Open source projects can display 
signals on their website, code repository, project blog, newsletter, or metrics dashboard. 
Projects can also contribute content to other outlets, such as news articles, contributed 
blog posts, conference presentations, and interviews. In these, it is important to display 
credible signals, which allows distinguishing between projects of low and high open 
source project health.  
Credibility of a signal is given when neither senders nor observers benefits 
from deceiving the other (Hasson, 1997). Literature considers signal display effort to 
demonstrate signal credibility (Connelly et al., 2011). A signal is considered credible 
when signal display effort is correlated negatively with the hidden quality, such that 
unhealthy projects have to expend more effort than a healthy project when displaying a 
signal. For healthy projects, the benefit of displaying a signal is expected to outweigh the 
signal display effort. Conversely, unhealthy projects refrain from displaying a credible 
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signal because the signal display effort outweighs the benefits (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). 
The theoretical discussion of signal display effort is summarized in Table 7 (adapted 
from Spence, 1974). 
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Table 7. Theoretical discussion of signal display effort (adapted from Spence, 1974). 
Signaling theory builds on game theory. Signaling theory assumes that a signaling equilibrium exists in a 
market. In a hypothetical signaling equilibrium, organizations rely on one signal that reliably indicates 
whether an open source project is unhealthy or healthy. Following is a theoretical discussion adapted from 
Spence (1974, pp. 18f). Changes include replacing senders and observers with projects and organizations: 
 
To demonstrate the hypothetical signaling equilibrium, we assume what organizations decide how much to 
contribute to an open source project depending on their belief about a project’s health. Suppose 
organizations believe that if y < ŷ, then projects are unhealthy, and that if y ≥ ŷ, then projects are healthy. 
If these are organizational beliefs, then their contribution will be a step function (Figure 1). Note that ŷ is 
just some number for the time being. 
  
 
Figure 1. Organizational contributions as a function of project health. (adapted from Spence, 1974) 
 
Given the contribution function, open source projects can determine how much effort to put into 
displaying the signal. Consider a project that sets y < ŷ. If it does, it will set y = 0, because signal display 
requires effort and until it reaches ŷ, there is no benefit to increasing y, given the hypothesized 
organizational contribution function. Similarly, a project that sets y ≥ ŷ will in fact set y = ŷ, since further 
increase would merely incur more signal display effort with no corresponding benefit. All projects will 
therefore either set y = 0 or set y = ŷ. Given the organizations’ initial beliefs and the fact just deduced, if 
organizations’ beliefs are confirmed, then unhealthy projects must set y = 0, while healthy projects set 
y = ŷ. Diagrams of the options facing open source projects are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2. Optimizing choice of signal display effort for unhealthy and healthy projects. (adapted from Spence, 1974) 
 
Superimposed upon the organizational contribution function are the signal display effort functions for 
unhealthy and healthy projects. Signal display effort is assumed higher (steeper slope) for unhealthy 
projects, and lower for healthy projects. Projects select y to maximize the difference between expected 
contributions and signal display effort. Given the level of ŷ in the diagram, it is easy to see that unhealthy 
projects select y = 0, and healthy projects set y = ŷ. Thus, in this case, organizations’ beliefs are 
confirmed, and we have a signaling equilibrium. In this hypothetical signaling equilibrium, unhealthy 
projects are discouraged from displaying the signal. 
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Organizations use signals in their decision-making, but signals are only 
effective when organizations pay attention to them (Connelly et al., 2011). Through 
signals, organizations get a better understanding of a project’s health and observe 
whether past decisions lead to expected outcomes (Spence, 1974). For future decisions, 
organizations pay more attention to signals that have correctly informed past decisions. 
Signals may be used differently by organizations because of varying objectives or 
differing beliefs about what a signal means. A signal has different relevance depending 
on the context it is used in, especially when a signal informs a specific aspect of a hidden 
quality (Hasson, 1997). Which signals an organization observes is also determined by 
how easily they are observable and how important a related decision is for an 
organization (Drover et al., 2017). 
3.2 Cooperative Signaling Behavior 
Cooperative signaling behavior occurs when senders and observers work 
together to improve their signaling activities (Spence, 1974). Spence (1974) demonstrated, 
using game theory, that signaling occurs in an environment with incentives for 
cooperative signaling behavior. Senders and observers can make signaling activities more 
effective by creating better signals or by optimizing signal activities. One of Spence’s 
(1974) examples is that professionals in the job market can create a certification for their 
profession. Employers can then use the certification as a signal to more easily determine 
whether a new hire is a professional. The professionals can expect better job offers as a 
benefit from the reduced uncertainty about their qualification.  
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Cooperative signaling behavior has been little explored as research focuses 
on studying existing signals, not their creation (Connelly et al., 2011; Heil & Robertson, 
1991). We know that signals emerge in response to trade-offs between costs and benefits 
for projects and organizations (Hasson, 1997). However, we do not know how signals are 
created in cooperative ways. 
A similar incentive structure for cooperative signaling as described by 
Spence (1974) can be found in organizational engagements with open source projects. 
Open source projects have an incentive to learn from organizations which signals receive 
attention and are effective for differentiating healthy from unhealthy projects. 
Organizations have an incentive to learn from open source projects which signals are 
available and how to correctly interpret signals. However, projects and organizations 
have to overcome challenges that signaling literature identified. 
Broadly, open source project health can be signaled by many indicators 
(Crowston et al., 2006) and has much potential for shaping an informational structure 
(Spence, 1974) – which signals open source projects display and organizations use. 
Therefore, to shape the informational structure, projects and organizations need to change 
the practices by which signals are displayed and used. In doing so, it is necessary to 
consider available signals together because they impact each other when displayed at the 
same time (Drover et al., 2017). A selection of a few signals can be more effective than 
all signals together because signals may together have a weaker effect than individually 
(Santana, 2014; Wang, Qu, & Tan, 2018). In some cases, the same signal is displayed to 
convey different but related information because fewer signals allow for more efficient 
communication (Santana, 2014). When projects display conflicting signals, organizations 
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may decide to delay engagement and observe open source projects longer before deciding 
(Worsham & Gatrell, 2005). Conversely, when signals corroborate the same message, 
they support each other and serve as a stronger signal (Miyazaki et al., 2005).  
To overcome these challenges, cooperative signaling behavior has the 
potential to provide answers to unsolved challenges, including how signals operate 
together, whether they strengthen each other, how many signals are optimal before an 
organization is overloaded with information, and what combination of signals is most 
effective (Kirmani & Rao, 2000). Cooperation then proves beneficial in shaping an 
informational structure because open source projects (senders) choose which signals to 
display, but organizations (observers) may pay attention to different sets of signals and 
interpret their meaning differently (Drover et al., 2017). Open source projects and 
organizations can determine, cooperatively, the meaning of signals and resolve the 
ambiguity that may arise from poorly defined informational structures.  
Open source projects and organizations engaging in cooperative signaling 
behavior may choose to structure their interaction in open source projects and create 
shared signals. It makes sense to leverage established open source collaboration 
mechanisms, especially since open source projects are fruitful grounds for developing 
shared practices and standards (Gandhi et al., 2018). In defining shared signals, open 
source projects and organizations reflect on their respective local signaling activities for 
displaying signals, and for using signals. Both sides may resolve different interpretations 
of what signals can mean and how they should be displayed. As projects and 
organizations learn more about signals, they can be expected to change how they use 
signals to understand project health (Gomulya & Mishina, 2017).  
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3.3 Conceptual Framework 
The research question is: How do open source projects and organizations 
create signals for open source project health? To investigate this question, I use 
signaling theory as a lens. Signals serve as alternative information for a hidden quality, 
such as project health. On one side is a sender, such as an open source project, which 
provides information about its hidden quality by displaying signals. On the other side is 
an observer, such as an organization, that uses this information to form an opinion about 
the hidden quality of the sender. Through cooperative signaling behavior, senders and 
observers create new signals to communicate about a hidden quality in new ways by 
displaying and using signals. Cooperative signaling behavior spans all of these activities, 
involving senders and observers. Figure 3 displays the relationship between concepts 
involved in signaling, which are summarized in Table 8. Based on this conceptual 
framework, the focus of this study is on cooperative signaling behavior but requires 
understanding all concepts. 
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Figure 3. Conceptual framework. A hidden quality is conveyed through signals.  Senders provide 
information about their hidden quality by displaying signals. Observers form an opinion about a 
sender’s hidden quality based on the signals they use. Through cooperative signaling behavior, 
senders and observers move beyond the hidden qualities to create signals and help each other 
with their respective signaling activities. The entire framework is subject to cooperative signaling 
behavior. 
Table 8. Concepts of the conceptual framework. 
Concept Definition Select References 
Cooperative 
Signaling 
Behavior 
Open source projects and organizations work 
together to shape an informational structure by 
creating signals and helping each other with their 
respective signaling activities. 
Santana, 2014; Spence, 1974 
Signals  
Credible alternative information. Several signals can 
be used to assess open source project health. 
Connelly et al., 2011; Crowston 
et al., 2006; Kirmani & Rao, 
2000; Spence, 1974; 
Signal Display 
Signaling activity of open source projects to provide 
signals. 
Connelly et al., 2011; Heil & 
Robertson, 1991; Spence, 1974 
Signal Use 
Signaling activity of organizations to assess open 
source projects health and make decisions based on 
signals. 
Connelly et al., 2011; Heil & 
Robertson, 1991; Spence, 1974 
Hidden Quality 
Difficult to convey information about an open 
source project such as open source project health – 
the potential that an open source project will 
continue developing quality software. 
Link & Germonprez, 2018; Ho 
& Rai, 2017; Naparat et al., 
2015 
Sender 
Open source projects want to inform organizations 
about their open source project health by displaying 
signals. 
Ho & Rai, 2017; Fogel, 2015; 
Bacon, 2012 
Observer 
Organizations want to know about open source 
project health by using signals. 
Link & Germonprez, 2018; 
Germonprez, et al., 2017; 
Eghbal, 2016;  
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4 Method 
To explore the research question, engaged field research was conducted (Van 
de Ven, 2007). From this field engagement, an applied context for investigating 
cooperative signaling behavior was used. From the context, a theoretical critique of 
cooperative signaling behavior was developed and strengthened through interviews.  
Figure 4 shows the sequence of method components.  
 
 
Figure 4. Methodological framework with foci and research activities. 
 
4.1 Field Engagement: Organizational Engagement with Open Source 
Projects 
The field engagement was informed by engaged scholarship principles (Van 
de Ven, 2007). Active participation in the field was a primary activity. As an active 
participant in various open source projects over the last decade, the work of these projects 
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was advanced, problems were solved, and I became recognized as a contributing member. 
I learned about the language, governance structures, and project workflows.  
4.1.1 Active Engagement in Open Source Projects 
For this study, field engagement was targeted at understanding organizational 
engagement with open source projects. Since starting my Ph.D. in 2015, I was strategic in 
selecting projects that advanced an overall understanding of organizational engagement 
with open source projects. Criteria in selecting projects as field sites included that they 
were open source projects where organizations participated in the development, a 
criterion met by a majority of Linux Foundation projects. 
Active engagement in several open source projects provided many 
opportunities for observing how organizations engaged with open source projects. Field 
sites included the SPDX project, the Hyperledger project, and the Core Infrastructure 
Initiative. Engagement in these projects involved a variety of different contributions. In 
the SPDX project, I conducted interviews about the level of adoption of their shared 
standard and presented findings for discussion with project members at the Open Source 
Leadership Summit 2017.
15
 In the Hyperledger project, I evaluated different wiki tools 
and discussed their use with project members.
16
 In the Core Infrastructure Initiative, I 
discussed criteria for new badging levels for the Best Practices Badge and translated the 
Best Practices Badge application into German.
17
 Through this active engagement in open 
source projects, contacts with practitioners in the field were established, rhetorical 
                                                 
 
15 https://github.com/SPDX-CaseStudy/files/blob/master/FocusGroup.pdf 
16 https://lists.hyperledger.org/g/discuss/message/49 
17 https://lists.coreinfrastructure.org/g/CII-badges/message/407 
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strength was developed, problems in organizational engagement with open source 
projects were better understood, and specific problems were solved. 
4.1.2 Participation in Open Source Conferences and In-Person Conversations 
Understanding organizational engagement with open source projects was 
further deepened by networking at open source conferences. I participated in ten open 
source conferences, including Open Source Leadership Summit (2017, 2019), Open 
Source Summit North America (2017, 2018), Open Source Summit Europe (2017, 2018), 
FOSDEM (2018), Mozilla Festival (2017, 2018), and Sustain Summit (2018). At a 
majority of these conferences, I presented my Ph.D.-related research work. Additionally, 
I attended talks and presentations from practitioners who spoke about issues around 
organizational engagement with open source projects, all deepening my understanding of 
organizational engagement with open source projects. 
Informal in-person conversations at open source conferences provided 
opportunities to orient myself in the field and to advance the understanding and rhetoric 
for talking about organizational engagement with open source projects. A total of 55 
semi-structured interviews were conducted through video conferencing software to orient 
myself and gain insights to organizational engagement with open source projects. 
Specific findings from these research engagements were documented in published papers 
(Link & Germonprez, 2016; Link, Gill, & Khazanchi, 2017; Link & Jeske, 2017; Link & 
Qureshi, 2017; Gandhi et al., 2018; Germonprez et al., 2018; Link & Germonprez, 2018; 
Link & Qureshi, 2018; Rao et al., 2018; Link et al., 2019). For the purpose of this study, 
the engaged field work provided the necessary understanding to navigate a context for 
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more deeply understanding how open source projects and organizations create signals for 
open source project health. 
4.2 Applied Context: CHAOSS Project and CHAOSS D&I Working 
Group 
An unconference session at the Open Source Leadership Summit 2017 was 
the start of a focused field engagement for investigating cooperative signaling in 
organizational engagements with open source projects. The session revealed that 
organizations were actively thinking about how to understand their engagements with 
open source projects and that health of these projects was on top of their minds. 
Following the session, the Community Health Analytics Open Source Software 
(CHAOSS) project was formally established within the Linux Foundation to combine 
efforts for understanding signals of open source project health and efforts for creating 
software tools to generate these signals. Since then, CHAOSS had a strong presence at 
nine open source conferences: Open Source Summit North America (2017, 2018), Open 
Source Summit Europe (2017, 2018), CHAOSScon Europe at FOSDEM (2018, 2019), 
CHAOSScon North America (2018), Open Source Leadership Summit (2018), and 
Community Leadership Summit (2018). Around 50 people attended each CHAOSS 
session at these conferences. Interest has come from organizational and foundational 
employees, project maintainers, and open source project members, indicating that this 
topic is important to various stakeholders. Figure 5 features logos of organizations that 
employ CHAOSS governing board members to show a sample of organizational and 
academic representation in the CHAOSS project. 
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Figure 5. Logos from organizations that employ CHAOSS Governing Board members. 
 
4.2.1 Balancing Field Engagement and Field Observation 
I helped grow the CHAOSS project as a founder, member of the governing 
board, and active contributor. Doing so revealed internal workings of the open source 
project and behavior of project members (Van de Ven, 2007). As it is important to 
consider the researcher’s role within the CHAOSS project because of his active role in 
the data creation ritual (Kozinets, 2015), a challenge encountered with the engaged field 
research was to balance observation and engagement. 
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Concerns stemmed from deep engagement potentially confounding what was 
studied (Kozinets, 2015). As a member of the community, it was easy to pick-up tasks 
such as taking meeting minutes, sending summaries to the CHAOSS mailing list, or 
responding to other members’ ideas. To strike a balance between observation and 
engagement, restraint provided space to observe interactions of others in a natural setting. 
Being immersed in community work and focusing on furthering goals of the community 
took attention away from observing for research. When this occurred, communication 
history in email discussions and collaboration platform archives served as documentation 
to reconstruct field observations. Observations in open source are often documented in 
archives and, thus, an alternating focus on research was less of a concern in the online 
environment than in non-digital field work. Observing and reporting on events first-hand 
while reconstructing event details from documents created in the moment is an accepted 
method for adding to a knowledge base (Whyte & Whyte, 1988).  
4.2.2 Learning from Field Notes and Theory 
Field notes were collected on the CHAOSS project, including insights not 
available through public documents but only brought to light from talking with open 
source project members and observing behavior as a member of these projects. Field 
notes included notes taken during meetings and end of day summaries. Observations 
were stored in Pocket, Box Sync, Google Drive, Zotero, Evernote, and OneNote (Figure 
6). Files and folders did not follow a uniform or integrated structure but were at times 
organized around themes, projects, events, stories, or sources.  
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Figure 6. Screenshots of field notes and their structure in (1) Pocket, (2) Box Sync, (3) Google 
Drive, (4) Zotero, (5) Evernote, and (6) OneNote. 
 
A hand-written research journal was created to complement work that was 
done digitally. The research journal was a large (13x21 cm) Moleskine “Cahier Journal” 
with 40 ruled pages bound in a brown cardboard cover (Figure 7). The journal helped 
with planning research steps, exploring challenges, recording progress, posing questions, 
and capturing feedback from research team members. What seemed important enough 
was written down, whether about method, timeline, potential new areas, or theory.  
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Figure 7. Front cover of research journal. 
 
Theorizing based on field observations was done through abductive reasoning, 
which is the generation of conjectures that can explain observations (Van de Ven, 2007). 
Conjectures about signaling theory were substantiated by learning from literature about 
which behaviors were expected and which concepts were relevant to observe. 
Conjectures focused the field work on observing concepts of signaling theory. In writing 
down and elaborating on the emerging theoretical understanding, shortcomings in the 
conceptual understanding were identified and the explanatory power of conjectures was 
improved. These insights guided an expansion of the field engagement to search for new 
evidence that can help substantiate these conjectures. While much of this work was 
unstructured, Table 9 provides a reconstructed example of these steps.  
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Table 9: Example conjecture evolution from observation, literature, to evidence collection. 
1. Observation in field engagement: Hyperledger included in a version release statement 
development activity metrics and a list of contributing organizations.
18
 
2.  Initial conjecture: Metrics and list of organizations are signals that Hyperledger 
displays to attract more organizations. 
3.  Literature: Signals are alternative information that facilitate engagement between 
sender and observer by overcoming information asymmetry. (Identified information 
asymmetry as a relevant concept). 
4.  Substantiated conjecture: Metrics and list of supporting organizations are signals that 
open source projects can display to attract organizations by reducing uncertainty 
about future support. (Incorporated information asymmetry). 
5.  Evidence from interacting with community members: Organizations pay attention to 
signals of how active development in an open source project is and whether well-
known organizations are engaging with a project. 
 
This example illustrates abductive reasoning, but in reality, abductive 
reasoning was opportunistic and did not follow a strict protocol. Some reasoning 
occurred from unstructured field notes in a research journal. By moving between field 
observations and theoretical framing, abductive reasoning helped identify what needed 
observing in the field. By analyzing observations through a theoretical lens, abductive 
reasoning helped make sense of observations and place them in context of a theoretical 
frame. The result was an emerging understanding of cooperative signaling behavior, 
which needed to be further developed.  
 
                                                 
 
18  This is the same example as from the introduction. Hyperledger announcing Fabric 1.0: 
https://www.hyperledger.org/announcements/2017/07/11/hyperledger-announces-production-ready-hyperledger-fabric-1-0 
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4.2.3 Engaging Community Members in a Focus Group 
To develop the emerging understanding of cooperative signaling behavior, a 
focus group was conducted at the Open Source Summit North America 2017. The goal 
was to get a deeper understanding of how project health signals would be used in 
decision making processes. Specifically, participants were asked to discuss what actions 
they want to inform with knowledge about how welcoming and inclusive open source 
projects are, what questions specifically they need answered, and how specific signals 
could help answer these questions. About 50 participants self-selected to participate in 
one of three groups. Each group focused on a different category of open source project 
health signals. The group relevant to this study focused on diversity and inclusion (D&I) 
signals. Notes on signals from the focus group were contributed to the CHAOSS project. 
These initial D&I signals were then advanced by a dedicated CHAOSS Diversity and 
Inclusion (D&I) Working Group. 
From observations during the inception of the CHAOSS project, an 
understanding formed that cooperative signaling behavior was emerging. It became clear, 
that signals were cooperatively created. Abductive reasoning and interaction with 
community members provided ways to theorize about the observations and develop an 
initial theoretical understanding. This understanding was leveraged to design an interview 
protocol for collecting more pointed data from experts. Field observations directly 
informed what questions to ask and how to ask them. The interviews were designed to 
challenge the initial understanding and get additional insights that may have been 
overlooked in the field engagement (Lynn, 1996). 
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4.3 Interviews: CHAOSS Diversity & Inclusion Signals 
An initial understanding of cooperative signaling behavior was constrained 
by what I paid attention to, took note of, and chose to put into writing (van Maanen, 
1988). Yet, the initial understanding of cooperative signaling behavior may not fully 
reflect reality as lived by open source projects and organizations (Lynn, 1996). Therefore, 
an interview protocol was designed to substantiate the theoretical understanding.  
Like the abductive reasoning, the interviews were localized in the work of the 
CHAOSS project. The CHAOSS project had two sub-communities within which signals 
were being developed: Diversity & Inclusion (D&I), and Growth-Maturity-Decline. To 
get a deep understanding and build focus of how signals were created, I localized 
research work in the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. The working group was selected 
because of my deep engagement in it, my access (convenience sampling), its 
organizational engagement dynamics, and strong community participation.  
 
4.3.1 Interview Protocol Design 
An interview protocol was designed using an assurance case method (Gandhi 
& Lee, 2009). The assurance case method provided a formal and auditable logic for 
developing interview questions based on the initial theoretical understanding and field 
observations. The assurance case method had been successfully used before to develop an 
interview protocol for understanding organizational engagement with open source 
projects (Gandhi et al., 2018). A visual assurance case (Appendix A) was constructed by 
deductively formulating claims informed by the conceptual framework and field 
observations. The theorizing described in section 4.2 and as exemplified in Table 9 (page 
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44) informed the claims. The top-level claim regarding cooperative signaling behavior 
was further refined into sub-claims through a series of rebuttals that can introduce doubts 
in the top-level claim. Sub-claims address a specific rebuttal and substantiate or counter 
the top-level claim via evidence collected through empirical evidence—interviews in this 
study. “As sub-claim doubts are eliminated, the assurance in the top-level claim increases. 
Such induction promotes high assurance by surfacing and addressing critical issues rather 
than supporting the top-level claim merely by observing similar repetitions through 
enumerative induction” (Gandhi et al., 2018, pp. 3–4). Inference rules documented what 
assumption underlie rebuttals and provided a place to substantiate the logic through 
additional rebuttals, claims, and evidence. A theoretical claim captured critiques of 
cooperative signaling behavior in organizational engagements as observed in the field 
engagement and applied context: 
Theoretical Claim TC: Open source projects and organizations engage in 
cooperative signaling behavior to create signals for open source project health. 
From this theoretical claim, rebuttals were added to address each concept of 
the conceptual framework (i.e., cooperative signaling behavior, signal display, signals, 
and signal use) because it introduced doubt to the top-level claim if any are missing. To 
counter each rebuttal, claims and sub-claims were developed. Each branch of rebuttals 
and claims concluded with evidence that needed to be collected through interviews. This 
logic branched out as demonstrated in Table 10. 
 
 48 
Table 10. Sample branch from assurance case demonstrates structure of claims and rebuttals. 
Top-Level Claim C0: A specific D&I signal was created by open source projects and organizations. 
Rebuttal R1 (Cooperative Signaling Behavior): Unless open source projects and organizations do 
not work together on the signal. 
Sub-Claim C1: Informants can name what open source projects and organizations were involved 
in advancing the signal. 
Rebuttal R1.2: Unless incentives for open source projects and organizations were not balanced. 
Sub-Claim C1.2: Informants believe that incentives for open source projects and organizations 
were balanced. 
Rebuttal R1.2.1: Unless concerns about the signal indicate that incentives are imbalanced. 
Sub-claim C1.2.1: Informants have no concerns about incentives created by the signal. 
Evidence E1.2: Replies showing who was involved in the development of the signal and 
how they balanced incentives. 
 
Each interview question was developed from a claim and designed to be 
understandable by informants (Creswell, 2013). Different language used in theory and 
open source projects was the reason why claims used the term “signal”, but interview 
questions used the term “metric”. Interview questions were open-ended to allow 
informants to expand on a question and have room for taking an interview in any 
direction they associated with a question. Answers to questions provided evidence for 
claims. Developing a question with evidence in mind could unintentionally result in 
leading question formulations. Spradley (2016) provided sample formulations for 
eliciting desired information which helped avoid leading questions. Some follow-up 
questions, derived from sub-claims, directly asked for specific details from informants to 
help informants know what information to provide (Whyte & Whyte, 1988). Table 11 
presents claims from above example and their associated questions. The interview 
protocol is available in Appendix B. 
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Table 11. A subset of claims and interview questions as identified through an assurance case 
method for developing an interview protocol. 
Claim Interview Question 
C0: A specific D&I signal was created by open 
source projects and organizations. 
Q0: I would like to focus our interview on a 
specific metric. Which diversity and inclusion 
metric would you like to focus on? 
C1: Informants can name what open source projects 
and organizations were involved in advancing the 
signal. 
Q1: What open source projects and organizations 
advanced the metric? 
C1.2: Informants believe that incentives for open 
source projects and organizations were balanced. 
Q1.2: How were incentives for open source projects 
and organizations balanced in the design of the 
metric? 
C1.2.1: Informants have no concerns about 
incentives created by the signal. 
Q1.2.1: What are typical concerns for using the 
metric? 
 
The assurance case and interview questions were audited by research team 
members involved in other projects related to organizational engagement with open 
source projects. As a team, we traversed the logic of the assurance case together and 
discussed each node in the structure. Team members reflected on the logic of the 
assurance case with their personal experience and observations. The resultant interview 
protocol was piloted in practice interviews with team members, which helped to fine tune 
the instrument, to make certain that questions were being understood similarly across 
informants, and to refine the pace and tempo of interview execution. Following each pilot 
interview, interview questions were revised until no further changes were needed to help 
ensure instrument reliability. 
4.3.2 Focused Interviews 
Of the 55 interviews, 16 focused interviews were conducted to strengthen the 
field engagement and applied context. Considering that much theorizing and data was 
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grounded in the field observations, these 16 focused interviews were conducted to 
identify anomalies and breakdowns in the aforementioned conceptual framework as well 
as to corroborate and refine it. After removing small talk, interviews lasted an average of 
one hour, resulted in 949 minutes audio recording, and 246 pages of transcripts.  
Informants were members of the CHAOSS project with an interest in open 
source project health, the CHAOSS D&I Working Group specifically, and other people 
interested in open source project health from a diversity and inclusion perspective who 
may not have been active CHAOSS members. Perspectives came from within (four 
informants) and outside (twelve informants) of the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. 
Informants included men and women, but an exact count cannot be provided because 
they were not asked to self-identify. All but one informant agreed to have their employer 
listed. The person who declined to have their employer listed had just started their own 
business and could be deanonymized based on their employment. Employer companies 
included Bitergia, Cloud Foundry, Collabora, Comcast, Elastic, Forefront, Google, IBM, 
Intel, Mozilla, Pivotal, Red Hat, TideLift, Travis Foundation, and Works Together.  
Each interview focused on one particular D&I signal to better reveal 
cooperative signaling behavior that shaped the signal and elevated it to be a recognized 
signal by the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. Informants chose from a list, provided by 
the CHAOSS D&I Working Group, which signal they were most knowledgeable about 
and wanted to explore during their interview. During each interview, the name and 
question of the chosen D&I signal was displayed to the researcher and informant on a 
shared screen to focus the conversation (Figure 8). 
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Figure 8. Screenshot of a D&I signal name and question as it was shared with informants during 
interviews. 
 
Potential concerns about the quality of interview data pertains to the quality 
of informants. Those concerns were identified in the assurance case, specifically in the 
inference rule: “Informants have experience with and pay attention to D&I in open source 
and organizations.” By collecting evidence to inform this inference rule, potential doubts 
regarding the quality of informants were offset. Collected evidence provides high 
confidence that interview data is of high quality as supported by the fact that informants 
demonstrated experience with diversity and inclusion in open source, participated in 
diversity and inclusion efforts, and represent different perspectives from projects and 
organizations. 
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4.3.3 Analysis of Interview Transcripts 
Interview transcripts were closely read to ensure an understanding of the data 
and to identify unexpected anomalies or breakdowns of the aforementioned conceptual 
framework. NVivo software was used to deductively code evidence from interview 
transcripts (Figure 9). Codes used were informed by the conceptual framework and 
included: (i) cooperative signaling behavior, (ii) signals, (iii) signal display, and (iv) 
signal use. These codes were chosen because they focused the analysis on signals, their 
creation, and their subsequent display and use. Under each code, sub-codes were 
inductively added to better organize specific details as they emerged. Sub-codes were 
partially informed by the assurance case and partially informed by repeat observations.  
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Figure 9. Screenshot of NVivo software as it was used for coding interview transcripts. The left 
shows all nodes (i.e., codes), how many files (i.e., interview transcripts) a node was applied in 
and how many references a node was used for. The middle shows one interview transcript. The 
right shows which sections of the transcript are coded to which nodes. 
 
From the coded interview protocols in NVivo, matrix displays were created 
in a spreadsheet. A separate matrix display was created for each code, i.e., concept of the 
conceptual framework. The creative task of arranging data in the matrix required deep 
understanding of the data. Analysis of the matrix display allowed comparing and 
contrasting across interviews and spotting patterns by arranging the data in meaningful 
ways (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Direct quotes were sorted into three columns (Table 
12): 1) evidence supporting the conceptual framework, 2) evidence that speaks to the 
conceptual framework but does not support it nor introduce doubt, and 3) evidence of 
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anomalies and breakdowns that require changes to the conceptual framework to account 
for them. Rows grouped evidence by interview. The level of data was direct quotes from 
transcripts to avoid data condensation during this analysis step (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). The layout ensured that all data from transcripts was represented in the matrix. 
Literature and field informed judgements decided which cell a direct quote was sorted 
into. Every direct quote in this paper bears a reference to its location in the effect matrix. 
For example, [1D7] points to cell D7 in the first worksheet of the effect matrix Excel file. 
 
Table 12. Matrix display used for analyzing interview transcript data. 
Concept  Interview Support Neutral Anomaly or Breakdown 
Cooperative Signaling 
Behavior 
 1    
 2    
 …    
      
Signal Display  1    
 …    
      
Signals  1    
 …    
      
Signal Use  1    
 …    
 
Each entry in the effect matrix was enriched with a formulated meaning to 
identify how a direct quote informed the conceptual framework (Creswell, 2013). Writing 
formulated meanings in square brackets in front of each direct quote in the effect matrix 
was an inductive task based strongly on literature and on a deep understanding of 
organizational engagement with open source projects resulting from field observations. 
Formulated meanings expanded on the sub-codes that had emerged during the interview 
coding. Formulated meanings were a way to take notes, summarize observations, and 
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capture their meanings; thus, documenting a step in the analysis process. Formulated 
meanings served as abstractions from direct quotes that helped to reflect on the 
conceptual framework, to reflect on field observations, to find patterns, and to speed up 
subsequent reviews of the data. Direct quotes were bolded as a way to mark them for 
consideration in the final writeup, if the quote succinctly stated a relevant observation. 
Figure 10 shows a screenshot of the effect matrix.  
 
 
Figure 10. Screenshot of effect matrix with one table cell zoomed in. A cell contains direct quotes 
from interview transcripts. Potential quotes for the final writeup are bolded. In square brackets, a 
formulated meaning was added before each direct quote. Quotes used in the assurance case 
oriented “Summary of Evidence” writeup were tagged with the evidence node of the assurance 
case (e.g., E1.1). 
 
Formulated meanings were written inside the matrix display. To get a better 
overview of anomalies and breakdowns, abbreviated versions of the formulated meanings 
were hand-written into the research journal (Figure 11). Recurring themes were marked 
with roman numerals to count their occurrences. The processing of formulated meanings 
facilitated reflection on the data. The resulting overview was instructive in determining 
what observations were important to highlight in the further analysis.  
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Figure 11. Picture of the research journal showing a hand-written overview of formulated 
meanings from the anomalies and breakdowns column. 
 
In a next step, observations and relationships identified in the formulated 
meanings were collected in a “Summary of Evidence” document (Figure 12). The 
summary focused on the anomalies and breakdowns at first but was enriched with 
observations from the remaining matrix columns. The document was structured with one 
section for each evidence node from the assurance case. The goal was to see how much 
evidence was collected for areas that the assurance case had identified and to summarize 
what was learned.  
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Figure 12. Screenshot of the “Summary of Evidence" document. 
 
In parallel with creating the summary of evidence document, notes were 
made in the research journal to maintain an overview of evidence nodes and their 
formulated meanings (Figure 13). These notes contained bullet items of observations that 
were identified to belong together. This form of memoing was used to channel thinking 
through writing (Miles & Huberman, 1994). The notes in the research journal were hand-
written to afford the flexibility necessary for a creative convergence task. As the analysis 
progressed, relationships between formulated meanings emerged. In sorting formulated 
meanings into evidence nodes from the assurance case, some formulated meanings could 
belong into multiple evidence nodes. These duplicate assignments were documented in 
the research journal and consequently fixed.  
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Figure 13. Notes in research journal made during creation of the “Summary of Evidence” 
document. 
 
The summary of evidence was shared and discussed with research team 
members to discuss the emerging narrative and impact on the conceptual framework. The 
summary of evidence was developed further to contain full sentences and to group 
evidence that was similar. The first draft of findings was an extended version of the 
summary of evidence document with direct quotes added to support findings. While the 
assurance case and its evidence structure were organized around the conceptual 
framework, the structure of the findings was changed through several iterations as the 
focus of the narrative shifted towards answering the research question. The research 
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question asked how signals were cooperatively created, and so the findings were 
organized around the steps that signals moved through as they were created. A thick 
description was added about how field observations from the context of the CHAOSS 
D&I Working Group informed cooperative signaling behavior. The thick description was 
based on field engagement and includes insights only available from participating since 
the working group was formed. The description was shared with community members for 
member checking. Community members accepted the description, found a blog
19
 to 
publish the description, and planned an interview on a podcast to promote the blog post.
20
 
4.4 Threats to Validity 
While following these methods, the aim of the qualitative approach was to 
ensure the accuracy of findings (Creswell, 2013). Accuracy can be compromised through 
threats to validity during different stages of the research project. Following are validation 
strategies (Creswell, 2013) and how they were applied in this study to mitigate different 
threats to validity. Creswell (2013) suggested that a study should have at least two 
validation strategies; I highlight four validation strategies used for this study. 
Threats to external validity were mitigated through prolonged engagement 
and persistent observation. Extended field observations were necessary to ensure a deep 
understanding of organizational engagement with open source projects as this area is 
deeply layered. In my four years of field engagement regarding organizational 
engagement with open source projects, I made field-informed decisions about what was 
                                                 
 
19 https://thenewstack.io/how-chaoss-di-can-help-diversity-in-the-open-source-community/ 
20 https://thenewstack.io/how-chaoss-measures-diversity-windows-gets-a-proper-terminal/ 
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able to be studied – considering such things as time, access, and availability. I built trust 
relationships with open source community members and became an integral part of the 
CHAOSS project, giving me access to data critical for studying cooperative signaling 
behavior. Finally, this enabled identifying knowledgeable informants who were well 
suited to inform this research. 
Threats to external validity were further mitigated through member checking. 
I solicited feedback from members of the CHAOSS D&I Working Group on conclusions 
I had drawn from the data. Member checking was not done on the raw data or theoretical 
claims but through contributions to signal definitions. Specifically, member checking was 
done on contributions to the CHAOSS D&I Working Group stemming from 
interpretations that came from this study. Contributions to signal definitions received 
positive feedback, verifying a good understanding of my data as it related to cooperative 
signaling behavior.  
Threats to internal and construct validity were mitigated through external 
audits of the methods and conclusions. Auditors were research team members who were 
knowledgeable about the research context but were not involved in the signaling research 
specifically. The assurance case method provided a structure to audit the development of 
the interview protocol. The explicit chain of evidence from the research question to 
collected evidence allowed auditing the internal validity of the interview protocol 
(Gandhi & Lee, 2009). Claims within the assurance case were informed by literature and 
field observations, which was audited through in-depth discussions with research team 
members. During data analysis, a summary of evidence document containing evidence 
collected through interviews was presented to research team members. From there, 
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regular reviews and conversations with team members about the writeup of findings 
validated that descriptions were logically rooted in the evidence. 
Threats to internal validity were further mitigated through a thick description 
of method and findings. A thick description is important because knowledge from a 
qualitative study is contextual as it emerges from interpersonal interactions that are 
context sensitive (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015). A thick description describes the research 
context, details observations, and explains how those observations translate into research 
findings (Creswell, 2013). Thereby, the thick description details supportive evidence, 
makes arguments explicit, and allows readers to judge the soundness of derived claims 
and to make new inferences (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2015; Creswell, 2013).   
4.5 Ethics 
Approval for this study was secured from the University of Nebraska at 
Omaha’s Institutional Review Board (IRB #: 693-18-EX). Identities of informants were 
protected by reporting only anonymized results. An ethical approach to field engagement 
was followed because open source projects are neutral territory (Kozinets, 2015). An 
overt role approach was followed (Whyte & Whyte, 1988). Specifically, I displayed my 
role as a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Nebraska at Omaha in all my online 
profiles and emails. In the field, I established relationships with open source project 
members. When scheduling one-on-one interviews, it was like asking a colleague or 
friend to chat about a specific topic of interest. After an interview ended, I was 
sometimes asked about my research and I explained what theory I am investigating, how 
it connected to my engagement in the CHAOSS D&I Working Group, and what 
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outcomes I planned to produce. The research was mutually beneficial because relevant 
information was contributed back to the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. 
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5 Findings: Creating Signals Cooperatively 
Field observations revealed how signals were created through cooperative 
signaling behavior. Cooperative signaling behavior was not visible in the creation of a 
single metric but could be observed across the entirety of activities by which a collection 
of signals was created. Therefore, understanding cooperative signaling behavior required 
looking at the creation of a collection of signals. These findings describe cooperative 
signaling behavior in the context of D&I signals as they were identified, evaluated, 
filtered, and then displayed and used. Figure 14 depicts a succession of processes that 
make up cooperative signaling behavior.  
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Figure 14. Cooperative signaling behavior is evident in how a collection of signals is created 
through identification, evaluation, and filtering, before they are displayed and used. The 
theoretical critique is in describing the processes used to create signals for representing a hidden 
quality. 
These processes emerged from field observations and were further explored 
and informed through 16 focused interviews. In identifying signals, community members 
from diverse contexts and backgrounds proposed signals with different goals and 
embodying different perspectives (5.1). In evaluating signals, shared methods for 
displaying signals were advanced to improve signals and to overcome difficulties in 
preparing them (5.2). In filtering, signals were not displayed or used unless they were 
being explained to community members, understood well, and made part of 
organizational routines (5.3). Finally, cooperative signaling behavior not only created 
new signals but also shaped how signals were displayed and used. Findings suggest that 
signals were displayed and used to improve the health of open source projects, without 
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consideration for the signal display effort, but organizations rarely used them in decision 
making (5.4).  
5.1 Identifying Signals 
Identifying signals is the first process for creating signals. The history of the 
Community Health Analytics Open Source Software (CHAOSS) project
21
 reveals the 
identification of diversity and inclusion (D&I) signals.  
5.1.1 D&I signals were proposed by community members from diverse contexts 
and backgrounds. 
The CHAOSS project was founded in 2017 by academics and open source 
practitioners as a Linux Foundation project focused on creating signals to help define 
open source project health. Early in the project, diversity and inclusion (D&I) emerged as 
a category of signals when CHAOSS community members grouped signals by the kind of 
questions they had about project health. At the time, CHAOSS used a wiki to organize 
and document its work on signals. The D&I signal category was documented first on 
May 15, 2017 (Figure 15). D&I signals were further grouped to inform subcategories 
“organizational diversity” and “geographic diversity.” Within each subcategory were the 
actual signals, called “activity metrics.”  
 
                                                 
 
21 https://chaoss.community 
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Figure 15. Screenshot of CHAOSS wiki showing initial D&I signals (i.e., “activity metrics”) as of 
May 15, 2017. Green signals link to detail pages that contain information about how to display 
the signals from data. 
 
Before the D&I category was created, members of the CHAOSS project had 
identified signals and documented them. Early D&I signals were suggested by 
community members on weekly conference calls and through mailing list discussions. 
Proposed signals were collected in the project wiki. Some signals were further specified 
in an associated signal detail page. A signal detail page contained more details about the 
signal, including how to implement the signal (Figure 16). Such an implementation was, 
for example, a SQL statement that could calculate a numeric value. The numeric value 
could then be displayed as the signal.  
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Figure 16. Screenshot of CHAOSS wiki showing the “contribution diversity” signal detail page 
that belonged in the D&I category. Page version from May 16, 2017. 
 
During this time, the CHAOSS project was officially announced as a new 
Linux Foundation project on September 11, 2017, at the Open Source Summit North 
America (OSSNA) in Los Angeles.
22
 In preparation for a large number of contributors 
that might join the project, the CHAOSS project changed its tooling. The wiki had 
restrictive edit permissions and thus did not allow everyone to make contributions. All 
wiki pages were copied into a GitHub repository.
23
 The benefit was that GitHub, a widely 
used platform for open source projects, offered a well-understood method for 
contributing. This repository was still in use at time of writing and allowed anyone to 
propose a new signal. 
                                                 
 
22 https://www.linux.com/news/if-you-cant-measure-it-you-cant-improve-it-chaoss-project-creates-tools-analyze-software 
23 https://github.com/chaoss/metrics 
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After the announcement at OSSNA, an increasing variety of people showed 
interest in the CHAOSS project, including members of many different open source 
projects and members of many different organizations. Interest came, for example, from 
the authors of the OpenStack Gender Report.
24
 Their report was based on a survey of the 
OpenStack project community. The authors were interested in advancing the D&I signals 
they displayed in the report and joined the conversation in the CHAOSS project. Another 
connection made during OSSNA was with the diversity and inclusion efforts at the 
Mozilla Foundation. Mozilla had presented the results of a large-scale, world-wide 
survey of people in open source and developed an agenda to address diversity and 
inclusion issues in open source projects.
25
 One of the issues Mozilla identified was the 
need to measure how well an open source project was doing with regards to diversity and 
inclusion. To work on this issue, Mozilla participated in the creation of D&I signals in 
the CHAOSS project. This leads to the first key finding related to identifying signals: 
D&I signals were proposed by community members from diverse contexts and 
backgrounds. 
When asked to walk through the creation of D&I signals, the diverse set of 
informants connected signal origin and advancement with specific community members. 
Community members who were seen to propose D&I signals, were often affected by a 
lack of diversity and inclusion and felt excluded, unwelcomed, or disadvantaged. Some 
faced harassment and threats to their wellbeing. The specific context and problem that 
community members were addressing determined which D&I signals they proposed. 
                                                 
 
24 https://superuser.openstack.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/OpenStack-Gender-Diversity-Report_Apr2017.pdf 
25 https://medium.com/@sunnydeveloper/take-action-innovation-requires-diversity-ossummit-foss-opensource-de24d8bf853d 
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D&I signals evolved starting from individuals, from people. Especially, people 
that were affected by the lack of diversity and inclusion. Because, if you are not 
affected you don't really understand it. That's why people that are affected are 
more involved, putting in a lot of effort, creating, and working on it because 
they really feel bad and understand it. It's not that other people don't care, but 
they don't really or fully understand, like the people that are affected by that. – 
[1B9] 
Informants who could not name specific community members referred to 
projects and organizations. They perceived community members who proposed D&I 
signals to be speaking on behalf of their project or organization. Informants listed a 
variety of projects and organizations who propose D&I signals, further confirming that 
signals were proposed by a variety of sources. 
For this signal, in particular, I don't know who was involved. I would say that in 
general when it comes to diversity and inclusion, I do think companies like 
[company] have been leaders. The [open source project] with [diversity and 
inclusion effort] has been publicly visible. I'm probably just forgetting really 
obvious organizations. I know there are more because there are many 
organizations that are focused on getting more women into open source. I 
suspect a lot of those groups have had a lot of influence and I'm just not 
remembering any of them right now. –[1D4] 
5.1.2 Proposed D&I signals had different goals and embodied different 
perspectives. 
The next major event leading up to the formation of the CHAOSS D&I 
Working Group was a focus group at OSSNA 2017 (Figure 17). In planning the focus 
group, CHAOSS members advanced a new way of thinking about signals. Signals were 
discussed as being informed by one or more numeric value and to be only useful if they 
informed specific actions. For example, a signal “gender diversity” may have been 
informed by the numeric value “ratio of women to men in a project.”26 The signal could 
                                                 
 
26 The CHAOSS project recognizes that gender is non-binary and exists on a spectrum. More complex signals were 
developed later. 
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then inform, for example, whether to launch an initiative with the aim of inviting more 
women to a project. During the focus group, participants were asked to self-select into 
smaller groups that talked about different categories of signals and one group decided on 
the D&I signals category.  
 
 
Figure 17. Photo of participants in the Open Source Summit North America 2017 focus group for 
CHAOSS signals. 
 
The focus group discussion was not bound by the signals previously 
identified and documented in the GitHub repository. Rather, participants were 
encouraged to propose new ideas for D&I signals. Three D&I signals emerged from the 
discussion: “contributor demographics,” “onboarding,” and “retention.” The first signal 
was about people in a project; the latter two were signals about interactions between 
community members. This shows that D&I signals were of different nature. Each group 
had a notetaker who captured the discussion. The notes were stored in the CHAOSS 
GitHub repository where anyone could review them and suggest improvements (Figure 
18). 
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Figure 18. Screenshot of notes from the group discussing D&I signals at the Open Source 
Summit North America 2017 focus group. Document version from September 20, 2017. 
 
Conversations and discussions in the months following OSSNA identified a 
need for the D&I signal conversations to be separated out from the general CHAOSS 
signal conversations. Up to this point, the CHAOSS community had one weekly 
conference call. Community members wanted to focus in-depth on the D&I signal 
category. The solution was the formation of the CHAOSS Diversity & Inclusion Working 
Group, or short CHAOSS D&I Working Group. Much time was spent in organizing the 
working group, setting up communication, aligning goals of community members, and 
building momentum of the working group. During the first half of 2018, the working 
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group decided to work on D&I signals in its own GitHub repository, to set up its own 
mailing list, and to have its own weekly conference call.  
During each conference call, community members took minutes 
collaboratively in a shared Google document and assigned “action items” to specific 
people who would report on the action item during subsequent meetings. These meeting 
minutes were shared with the mailing list to ensure community members could stay up-
to-date without having to attend every conference call. When a discussion occurred 
during a call, for example, about designing a template for how to document a D&I signal, 
the discussion was continued on the mailing list, again, to include more community 
members. Conference calls were recorded and published on YouTube to allow revisiting 
discussions and including anyone who could not join (Figure 19).  
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Figure 19. Screenshot of a CHAOSS D&I Working Group conference call recording from June 
20, 2018. The screenshot shows the collaborative process of working in a shared Google 
document to design a template for signal detail pages. 
 
New D&I signals were first created in a Google document, where everyone 
had edit rights. Everyone was encouraged to contribute ideas to the document and 
comment on the ideas of others. Community members were enabled to express, discuss, 
and resolve different goals and needs for a signal. Google documents were tracked at the 
project level in GitHub issues. Each document had its own issue which linked to the 
document (Figure 20). Community members converted the document to a markdown 
page for the GitHub repository when a D&I signal was well enough defined. Review and 
revision of the D&I signal continued in the GitHub workflow for adding a page to a 
repository. When the new D&I signal was accepted, the markdown page became part of 
the GitHub repository and the associated issue was closed. D&I signals were further 
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revised when community members added or corrected something to better achieve their 
own goals for the signal. 
 
 
Figure 20. Screenshot of a GitHub issue for tracking a proposed signal and the associated 
Google document. Community members work in the Google document to advance the signal. 
 
D&I signals were identified from a variety of community members who had 
different backgrounds and goals for these signals. Over time, more signals were identified 
to support these different perspectives, leading to the second key finding related to 
identifying signals: Proposed D&I signals had different goals and embodied different 
perspectives. 
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Informants had observed within their own projects that identified D&I signals 
were proposed and advanced by community members who worked with other community 
members such that a project could become more welcoming and inclusive if it started 
displaying D&I signals. With more community members joining a conversation, ideas on 
what D&I signals to display changed. These conversations resulted in a variety of 
proposed D&I signals which had different goals or embodied different perspectives. 
The QA community in a given bigger community would say, "Hey, we would 
like to promote this signal." Or the documentation team would say, "We would 
like to promote the documentation signal." It's been bottom-up, each of those 
communities that wanted to be measured, measured themselves, and propagated 
the signal up. – [1B5] 
Cooperation within and across projects resulted in an increasing acceptance 
that diversity and inclusion was worth addressing. However, D&I signals were very 
diverse and community members lacked a shared method for displaying D&I signals. 
Without such shared methods, community members displayed D&I signals differently, 
which made it difficult to understand D&I signals across projects as D&I signals had 
different goals and embodied different perspectives. 
What I have seen over time is more awareness of [D&I signals]. The signals 
have not advanced as quickly as the understanding has. In part, I think, because 
projects are challenged to gather them a standardized way. – [1C5] 
Field observations and interviews found that the first process in creating 
signals was identifying signals which is the collecting of ideas for new D&I signals. 
Table 13 provides a summary of the key findings related to identifying signals. 
Cooperative signaling behavior is evident in identifying D&I signals because community 
members work together in coming up with ideas for and proposing D&I signals. As many 
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different D&I signals were proposed, community members engaged in the CHAOSS D&I 
Working Group to collect proposed D&I signals.  
We started the CHAOSS D&I Working Group and attracted a community. Then, 
we realized that we were missing many ideas and comments from people. – 
[1B3] 
 
Table 13. Key findings regarding identifying signals. 
Key Concept Description 
Supporting 
Evidence 
A hidden quality 
was represented by 
different signals 
Many different signals were proposed to inform open 
source project health. Identifying signals involved 
collecting these diverse ideas for potential signals.  
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Proposed signals 
were not clearly 
defined at first 
Proposed signals were ideas that lacked clarity before they 
were documented and discussed. Identifying signals 
involved writing a definition of a signal so that it could be 
refined and improved cooperatively. 
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Signals came from 
diverse contexts 
and backgrounds 
Community members who proposed signals came from a 
variety of contexts and backgrounds. Identifying signals 
involved understanding these contexts and backgrounds and 
translating a proposed signal to be meaningful for 
community members from other contexts and backgrounds. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Signals were 
proposed by people 
and organizations 
who needed them 
Both – people and organizations – proposed signals when 
they could benefit from improving how open source project 
health was understood. Identifying signals involved 
learning from these people and organizations how signals 
could serve their need. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Proposed signals 
had different goals 
and perspectives 
Signals were proposed to serve specific goals and different 
signals had different goals. Identifying signals involved 
debating proposed signals with many community members 
to incorporate their goals so that a signal could serve more 
perspectives.  
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Signals with 
similar goals were 
grouped together 
It was easier to discuss signals when they were grouped 
together. Identifying signals involved comparing goals of 
signals and finding similar goals so that signals could be 
grouped together.  
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Signals were about 
different things 
Signals for open source project health could be about 
different aspects of a project, such as its people, their 
processes, their outputs, or what others said about a project. 
Identifying signals involved documenting what a signal was 
about and how it informed a hidden quality. 
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
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5.2 Evaluating Signals 
Evaluating signals is the second process for creating signals. Work in the 
CHAOSS D&I Working Group advances signals and reveals evaluation of signals.  
5.2.1 Shared methods for displaying signals improved D&I signals. 
Over time, the CHAOSS D&I Working Group evaluated proposed signals for 
example by advancing a standard way to document them. By standardizing how signals 
were documented, the CHAOSS D&I Working Group identified what information was 
important for displaying or using a signal. The template for a signal detail page (i.e., 
“Resource Page”) included at the top the name of a signal and underneath a high-level 
question that a signal can answer (Figure 21). While a signal was under development, a 
disclaimer warned potential users of the unfinished state. The template specified five 
sections that described a signal in detail. First, “Description” provided a rationale why a 
signal may be important to display and use. Second, “Sample Objectives” were a list of 
reasons why someone might want to display or use a signal. Third, “Sample Strategies” 
listed methods for displaying a signal, leaving specific steps to the subsequent section. 
Fourth, “Sample Success Metrics” described instructions for how to execute a method for 
displaying a signal, from data collection, to display, to interpretation. Fifth, “Resources” 
listed references and related work that provided additional background information or 
supported claims about a signal. After creating the template, D&I signals were advanced 
by filling in the template for each signal, which required evaluating what information 
went into each section of the template. Filling in missing information improved the 
quality of signal descriptions. 
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Figure 21. Screenshot of the template for a D&I signal detail page (Resource Page) containing a 
signal name and question, followed by five sections: 1. Description, 2. Sample Objectives, 3. 
Sample Strategies, 4. Sample Success Metrics, and 5. Resources. Document version from January 
26, 2019. 
 
As the number of proposals for signals grew, CHAOSS D&I Working Group 
members decided to organize signals in focus areas. The creation of seven focus areas 
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was informed by Mozilla’s 2017 research recommendations27 which provided a stronger 
foundation for the organization of signals. Figure 22 shows the seven focus areas in the 
CHAOSS D&I Working Group repository.  
 
 
Figure 22. Screenshot of focus areas in the README on the CHAOSS D&I Working Group 
GitHub repository. Document version from April 15, 2019. 
 
The CHAOSS D&I Working Group, like the rest of the CHAOSS project, 
adopted a Goal-Question-Metric approach (Basili, 1992). The logic behind this approach 
was that signals were only useful if it was known how to use them in answering specific 
questions. The Goal-Question-Metric approach challenged the group to evaluate the 
utility of signals. Within the GitHub repository structure, the focus areas were connected 
                                                 
 
27 https://opensource.com/article/17/9/diversity-and-inclusion-innovation 
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to a high-level goal that someone might have when looking for signals. Within each focus 
area were a set of questions that further narrowed down the choice of signals (Figure 23).  
 
 
Figure 23. Screenshot of "Event Diversity" focus area, showing the goal, a list of questions, and 
subsequent signals (i.e., Name). 
 
Each question had its own signal detail page (Figure 24), which provided 
qualitative and quantitative methods for capturing data that could be displayed as signals. 
Some community members shared methods and experiences from their own open source 
projects. Some community members were interested in applying a method in their open 
source project and asked for feedback and insights from others.  
Stemming from the desire to share signals with others led to developing a 
standardized template for documenting signals and establishing a research-informed 
structure for organizing them. This improved coordination within the working group and 
communication with open source projects and organizations. Additional details were 
identified to improve methods for displaying signals. This leads to the first key finding 
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related to evaluating signals: Shared methods for displaying signals improved D&I 
signals. 
 
Figure 24. Screenshot of "Attendee Demographics" question detail page from the “Event 
Diversity” focus area, showing a selection of metrics that can be used as signals. 
 
Informants described different methods for displaying D&I signals. Data 
collection varied by project and by tools used in a project. For several D&I signals, there 
was no automatic process for data collection, and signal display was done manually. 
Which methods for collecting data work was determined by community members who 
piloted different approaches. 
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There are a couple of things we can do. Both are manual. It's time-intensive, and 
I'm not aware of software that exists that does this, but it would be fantastic if it 
existed. You can go to the foundation that hosts a particular project and ask 
them for those numbers. Or because, by virtue of open source, all of these things 
are public, you can go through and painstakingly actually manually do a count. 
The second one is more time-intensive than the first. We've done the first. — 
[2B12] 
Some D&I signals were prepared to be displayed by using a tool that 
collected data and calculated numeric values. Tools for numeric values used data from 
collaboration tools that community members coordinated and executed their work with. 
This approach provided insight into who was doing which tasks, as long as interactions 
within a project were facilitated through a tool that captured such metadata. 
Our expertise is mostly related to a quantitative approach. The method would be 
running some specific tools, either [tool 1], [tool 2] or [tool 3] or any other kind 
of tool. The first step is to list all of the data sources that you have. For this first 
step, you really need to know and understand what's the infrastructure that you 
are using in your project. – [2B3] 
For a proposed D&I signal, displaying it was sufficient at first regardless of 
the method because it demonstrated that community members were aware of and working 
on related issues. It was beneficial to piloting methods for signals because it created a 
viable signal and experience was gained with the signal. When more projects provided a 
similar D&I signal, more evaluation of the signal was necessary. Community members 
evaluated signals cooperatively by comparing how signals were prepared, displayed, and 
used. From these pilot tests, community members learned more about a D&I signal and 
established a better shared understanding. Such improved D&I signals more accurately 
demonstrated a commitment to diversity and inclusion.  
For a while, everyone was saying they had a code of conduct [i.e., the D&I 
signal], even if it was not really one. With the code of conduct assessment tool 
that [a foundation] built for its open source project support grant, I think we're 
starting to be able to help a project say: “We have a strong code of conduct 
according to this evaluation tool.” – [1B7] 
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5.2.2 It was difficult to display correct D&I signals. 
In the CHAOSS D&I Working Group, adding methods to a signal detail page 
was an integral part of evaluating signals and included discovering issues with methods 
and overcoming those issues. Several issues with displaying signals were discussed, 
including issues with data sources, data management, visual representation, and language. 
For example, when looking at diversity of contributions within commits in a repository, 
using the phrase “technical versus non-technical contributions” discounted the technical 
nature of many contributions, such as documentation writing. As a solution, CHAOSS 
D&I Working Group members concluded that “code versus non-code contributions” was 
a better way to signal diversity of contributions because it fit with the data the signal was 
created from and because it did not discount anyone’s contributions. 
CHAOSS D&I Working Group members did not resolve all issues. Some 
issues were documented as part of signal descriptions (Figure 25). By not resolving issues, 
CHAOSS D&I Working Group members acknowledged that D&I signals are context 
dependent and that making assumptions about specific contexts might resolve an issue 
only in theory but not for the contexts the signals may be used for. A preferred approach 
emerged in documenting known issues and waiting for feedback from community 
members who tried to deploy a D&I signal within their context. This leads to the second 
key finding related to evaluating signals: It was difficult to display correct D&I signals. 
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Figure 25. Screenshot of the CHAOSS D&I Working Group repository showing an example of 
unsolved issues. Document version from February 22, 2019. 
 
Informants agreed that D&I signal display was fraught with issues and could 
not be fully reliable. Three difficulties emerged. Difficulty 1: Demographic information 
was not easy to observe from an appearance of a person or their public profiles, like 
LinkedIn or Twitter. This included inferring someone’s age, gender, sexual orientation, 
religion, political affiliation, skill level, ethnic heritage, or other demographic information. 
Inferences based on name, photos, work history, or other available information were 
inaccurate. 
We started off with just looking at code contributions and then saying, “Which 
of the code contributions came from women with female names,” and 
[company] struggled sometimes with the fact that Asian names or certain other 
names are harder to classify as female versus male. They needed some volunteer 
help to do that. The other challenge is that many women choose not to use a 
female name in their contributions because they feel that otherwise their 
contributions get blocked or don't get accepted. – [2D11] 
A more reliable method for collecting demographic information was self-
disclosure. Surveys were a popular method to ask for sensitive information. Surveys were 
work intensive because they required advance planning, infrastructure, advertising, data 
management, and analysis. This effort may not lead to desired information because 
community members did not always fill out surveys and results get skewed easily when 
only a few people from a minority demographic participated in a survey. Because of a 
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survey’s high-cost, limited return, and the potential of annoying people by asking them to 
take a survey, community members who prepared D&I signals tried to infer demographic 
information first. This approximation was less reliable but might have sufficed. 
We were curious about the diversity in our project. We wanted to just try to see 
where we stand. I sent out a voluntary survey to all full-time dedicated 
committers. I pinged people a few times and got maybe 50-60% response rate. I 
don't know how often we'll do that again because people get tired of answering 
surveys. The other thing I did, just for myself, I took all committers and was 
like: “I think I'll count this person as a woman,” or “I think I'll count this person 
as a man.” That probably came up with a more accurate number than the 
voluntary survey that got half the respondents. However, there's a problem with 
me doing that. I think it’s fine to take that approximation, but there’s certainly a 
problem that you obviously can't even begin to start with sexual orientation or 
things like that. I would never publish data in which I assigned people what I 
think they are. – [2C13] 
Some projects maintained a collaboration tool that allowed community 
members to have a profile and disclose sensitive information there. This information 
could then be used to generate numeric values about community members’ demographics 
to be displayed as D&I signals. However, surveys and other self-disclosure options were 
not used by all community members and especially members of minority demographics 
were cautious about providing information about themselves.  
A very emblematic method in the [project] community was for the signal that 
we had for gender participation. Our user interface gave you the option of 
specifying a gender in order to customize the user interface. You then got 
gendered pronouns correctly on the user interface. But that was optional. And, 
of course, many people did not set it. Therefore, the baseline data that we had 
was very poor, and we knew it from the beginning. – [2D5] 
Difficulty 2: Diversity and inclusion impacted interactions between 
community members and should be measured as it was manifested in these interactions. 
When a project was welcoming and inclusive, it was so because community members felt 
they were welcomed and included as a result of how others interacted with them. D&I 
signals should be about the quality of interactions, which were difficult to measure, 
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especially as channels for interaction varied. Additionally, diversity and inclusion were 
often understood less in terms of a specific numeric value but more as a sense of diversity 
and inclusion. Quality of interactions and a sense of diversity and inclusion were difficult 
to capture and express as a numeric value. 
I'm trying to see if there is a way to measure, but I can tell you that if people 
have a good first impression, it's more likely, that they will engage quicker with 
the community. They are excited when they send us the first email, and if they 
feel that the community was very welcoming, then they get a boost to start 
contributing and keep engaging with the community. – [3D17] 
Difficulty 3: D&I signals consisted of many components that were difficult to 
be assessed separately and more difficult to be aggregated into a single signal. For 
example, the CHAOSS D&I Working Group identified “communication” in a project as 
important for its welcoming and inclusive nature. However, evaluating how to signal 
communication within a project revealed a variety of difficulties. Calculating a numeric 
value that could serve as a D&I signal from a communication perspective was 
challenging. The difficulty came from technical challenges of measuring diversity and 
inclusion within communication and was amplified when trying to aggregate across 
different communication technologies. Different communication technologies (e.g., code 
repository, issue tracker, chat, or email list) were used for different kinds of 
communication and elicit different behavior, thus requiring different ways of determining 
diversity and inclusion.  
In order to get the best technical solution for a D&I signal on communication, 
you need to work through several levels of depth. You get a unique breadth of 
communication, like many different views and backgrounds but also you need 
depth. You need details about the technology that's being worked on, the use 
cases, and the scenarios. You need many levels of details. – [3D14]  
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In addition to aggregating from diverse data sources, projects needed to 
collect such data. Some collaboration tools collected more metadata than others. This 
data included personal information about community members but also related to 
interactions and behaviors within a project. It is challenging to convince community 
members to change established collaboration tools and workflows around them, 
especially when it is only to collect more data. Therefore, available data was often limited 
for open source projects. 
Some of it is going to be the nature of the forum. I use forum very broadly here. 
For example, if you use [tool 1] for your mailing lists, getting information on 
non-code contributions through the mailing lists is going to be very difficult. 
Because you lack a lot of meta-data. Whereas, if you use [tool 2], you can do a 
lot to drill down. You can look at tags, you can look at who the top participants 
are, what the distribution of the participation is. You can do some of that with 
[tool 1], but it's much more difficult. – [2D5] 
Field observations and interviews found that the second process in creating 
signals was evaluating signals. Evaluating signals took proposed D&I signals as inputs 
and produced better understood D&I signals. Table 14 provides a summary of the key 
findings related to evaluating signals. Cooperative signaling behavior is evident in 
evaluating D&I signals because it involved discussing D&I signals, coming to a shared 
understanding, overcoming issues for displaying D&I signals, and sharing experiences 
with D&I signals. Community members discussed in the CHAOSS D&I working group 
ideas on how to display D&I signals. They worked within the structure of the working 
group to advance D&I signals and developed signal detail pages for learning about D&I 
signals. Community members evaluated D&I signals based on what they learned from 
each other, from projects, and from organizations. 
I see D&I signal development as the work that we're doing in the CHAOSS D&I 
Working Group. – [1D7] 
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Table 14. Key findings regarding evaluating signals. 
Key Concept Description 
Supporting 
Evidence 
A standard for 
signals was 
developed 
A standard way to document signals provided a practical 
means for improving signals. Evaluating signals involved 
developing a standard that dictated what information about 
a signal needed to be provided.  
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Bottom-up and  
top-down 
approaches were 
used 
Signals were defined bottom-up (i.e., available data was 
elevated as signals) and top-down (i.e., signals were created 
to answer specific questions). Evaluating signals involved 
both approaches— working from available data and 
working from questions—to ensure that signals could be 
displayed and were meaningful. 
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
methods were 
advanced  
Signals could be prepared for display through qualitative 
and quantitative methods. Evaluating signals involved 
defining specific steps required for collecting data and 
displaying signals, which were more likely to be 
automatable for quantitative methods.  
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Signals were 
piloted  
Community members piloted methods for displaying 
signals to learn more about signals and to get benefits of 
signaling project health. Evaluating signals involved 
improving signals based on experience from piloting 
signals. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Signal quality was 
improved 
The importance of signal quality increased with more 
projects displaying a signal. Evaluating signals involved 
improving signal quality based on feedback from projects 
and organizations that were displaying and using signals. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Data availability 
for signals was an 
issue 
In the top-down approach, data for a signal that could 
answer specific questions might be difficult to obtain. 
Evaluating signals involved discovering ways to answer 
specific questions with data that could be obtained, thus 
overcoming issues related to data availability. 
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Explaining how a 
signal related to a 
hidden quality was 
an issue 
A signal had to inform about a hidden quality. Evaluating 
signals involved describing how a signal was related to a 
hidden quality so that community members could learn to 
interpret a signal similarly. 
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
Signals involved 
loss of information 
Open source project health as a hidden quality was more 
complex than its signals, resulting in a loss of information. 
Evaluating signals involved identifying which aspects of a 
hidden quality could be captured in signals and expressing 
clearly the limits of what could be learned about a hidden 
quality from a signal. 
Field Observations 
Focus Group 
Interviews 
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5.3 Filtering Signals 
Filtering signals is the third process for creating signals. To understand how 
signals are filtered, we observe how the CHAOSS D&I Working Group promotes the use 
of D&I signals and helps establish their use.  
5.3.1 Educating community members on D&I signals helps establish signals. 
Not every signal that was identified and evaluated by the CHAOSS D&I 
Working Group would be displayed and used. Because open source projects individually 
decided whether to display a signal, the signals that failed to be displayed and used could 
be considered as having been filtered out. The CHAOSS D&I Working group employed 
several strategies to drive signal adoption and thereby to help signals “pass through the 
filter.” To drive adoption, CHAOSS D&I Working Group members actively promoted 
D&I signals through writing blog posts and speaking at conferences. Conference sessions 
held by CHAOSS D&I Working Group community members included: 
 August 28, 2018: “Establishing Metrics that Matter for Diversity & 
Inclusion” (CHAOSScon28 North America 2018, Vancouver, CA)  
 August 29, 2018: “D&I Metrics Hack-a-thon” (Open Source Summit 
North America 2018, Vancouver, CA) 
 October 24, 2018: “Tutorial: How to Prepare a Diversity and Inclusion 
Report for your Community” (Open Source Summit Europe 2018, 
Edinburgh, UK) 
 February 1, 2019: “Diversity & Inclusion WG Tutorial” (CHAOSScon 
Europe 2019, Brussels, BE) 
 March 14, 2019: “Panel Discussion: Metrics that Matter: Forging a Path 
to More Diverse, Inclusive Communities” (Open Source Leadership 
Summit 2019, Half Moon Bay, CA, USA) 
                                                 
 
28 CHAOSScon is a conference series organized by CHAOSS project members to bring together anyone interested in 
displaying or using signals for open source project health. Every year, CHAOSScon North America is co-located with 
the Open Source Summit North America and CHAOSScon Europe is co-located with FOSDEM. 
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The first key finding related to filtering of signals is: Educating community 
members on D&I signals helps establish signals. 
Informants identified education on D&I signals as critical for D&I signals to 
pass the filtering process. Education helped more community members to learn about 
displaying and using D&I signals, informing their decision to adopt those D&I signals. 
Community members may drive education because they wanted more projects to display 
D&I signals and more organizations to use D&I signals. Community members 
cooperatively educated each other to learn about D&I signals, to advance them, and to 
start using them. Education occurred, among other ways, through blog posts. 
We're going to put a blog post out on [a new tool for D&I signal preparation]. 
Hopefully, the signal gets on people's radars. I know that [project] is going to 
use that tool. People will want to use it when they know it's there. The thing is, a 
lot of D&I signals are cutting edge. – [4B7] 
Education also occurred through conference presentations, meetings, and 
panel discussions. Community members who organized events could drive education 
because they decided on keynotes, sessions, and special topics that got attention. They set 
the tone for an event and thereby influenced what attendees talked about and cooperated 
on back in their projects and organizations. 
We started reporting on D&I signals for [a conference]. I remember, at [another 
conference], being involved in an unconference session to plan for the diversity 
track for [a third conference], and one person saying this D&I signal should be 
applied to all events: Women should receive a greater representation on keynote 
stages. – [1B12] 
Signals are displayed and used by different community members. Education 
ensures that they understand each other and interpret signals in a similar way. With 
regards to who displayed signals, it was the community members from within a project 
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because they have the necessary knowledge about their project. The following quote 
exemplifies that community members outside of a project can only use a displayed signal. 
You can't go do a survey of each open source project before deciding whether or 
not to add it to your software dependency chain. – [4C5] 
Experiences and lessons learned from putting D&I signals into practice were 
valuable for educating community members. Additionally, D&I signals became more 
useful as more projects and organizations adopted them. As more projects displayed a 
D&I signal, organizations could start relying on using the signal. Through further display 
and use of D&I signals, community members had more opportunities to learn about them. 
I don't think that event organizers specifically mention D&I signals. Mostly, 
they just say: “The outcome of the event are these numeric values.” D&I signals 
are something that needs to be mentioned more often in a sponsorship 
prospectus. Event organizers need to mention it more often because if you 
mention more often, companies will start to look at it when they try to make 
sponsoring decisions. – [1B9] 
D&I signals became more widely displayed and used as an interplay of more 
projects displaying them so that more organizations started using them and, conversely, 
more organizations requesting to use them so that more projects started displaying them. 
The latter part is evident in an example where projects started displaying D&I signals 
when they applied for a grant program that included D&I signals as a funding 
requirement. Through such a requirement, projects were compelled to display D&I 
signals because organizations started using them.  
I was talking with [someone] about the notion that we would hold a project 
accountable for something like diversity and inclusion to have access to funding. 
I explained to them: “There's no one that can make someone display a D&I 
signal, but if they're going to apply for something like a grant, well, they might 
have to think about it.” And that's where they were like: “Oh, right.” They never 
thought about the fact that organizations can hold projects accountable through 
things like funding and grant awards. – [1B7] 
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5.3.2 Well-understood D&I signals were more successful in passing the filtering. 
At time of writing, D&I signals from the CHAOSS D&I Working Group 
were piloted in some contexts. For example, the OpenStack Gender Diversity Report 
included new signals on mentorship programs.
29
 The report authors had previously 
identified and evaluated the new signals in the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. 
Experience from implementing the new mentorship signals was shared with the 
CHAOSS D&I Working Group members. In another example, Mozilla had adopted D&I 
signals in their MOSS grant for open source projects.
30
 Again, experiences from this pilot 
of D&I signals were shared within the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. Additionally, the 
CHAOSS D&I Working Group was talking with more open source projects that were 
interested in displaying D&I signals.  
The CHAOSS D&I Working Group realized the importance of helping open 
source projects understand the value of and methods for displaying D&I signals. In this 
vein, the working group’s goals31 for the year 2019 (Figure 26) included documenting 
three high-quality and compelling use cases for D&I signals, partnering with projects to 
pilot display of D&I signals, establishing ethical guidelines around displaying D&I 
signals, and establishing a more sophisticated workflow for advancing methods for 
displaying D&I signals. This leads to the second key finding related to filtering signals: 
Well-understood D&I signals were more successful in passing the filtering. 
 
                                                 
 
29 https://superuser.openstack.org/articles/2018-gender-diversity-report/ 
30 https://blog.mozilla.org/inclusion/2018/12/18/innovating-for-inclusion-in-the-mozilla-open-source-support-program/ 
31 https://github.com/chaoss/wg-diversity-inclusion/blob/master/goals-2019.md 
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Figure 26. Screenshot of Goals for 2019 for the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. Document 
version from January 28, 2019. 
 
Informants reported that well-understood D&I signals, like a code of conduct, 
were more successful in passing the filtering. A code of conduct is a way to outline 
accepted behavior within a project and establish consequences for violators. It serves as a 
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signal because it could be observed to exist but did not reveal deeper issues, such as 
whether it was enforced and whether a project was welcoming and inclusive. Therefore, a 
project was displaying a D&I signal by having a code of conduct. 
I have seen many communities that have a code of conduct. They say, "We have 
the code of conduct," and they have it in a visible place where people can see it. 
– [2B9] 
Another D&I signal that had successfully passed the filtering and was well-
understood is “speaker demographics”, which indicated diversity of speakers at events. 
This D&I signal was inherent in an event schedule. Displaying photos of speakers 
provided an additional, visual aid for observers to get an idea of gender distribution. 
Many events displayed speaker demographics as its value had been demonstrated by 
event organizers. Attendees, sponsors, and speakers have come to expect the signal and 
use it when determining which events to patronize.  
If event organizers hope to get to full representation within their speaker or 
attendee lineup, if they hope to attract speakers or attendees to their event, then 
they need to display speaker demographics. They need to make sure that the 
composition of their speakers matches who they want to attract to their project. – 
[2B12] 
Open source projects displayed D&I signals, if it was well-understood how 
they helped improve project health. Projects paid attention to which D&I signals were 
observed and used, thereby cooperatively determining which D&I signals to display.  
I think every project I've ever dealt with is very pragmatic about displaying D&I 
signals. You have to show how it's tied to community health overall. If you can 
explain that, people will display it. If you don't explain it, people won't display it. 
I think that's probably true in most of these signals. – [2B5] 
Consequently, informants struggled to remember seeing lesser-known D&I 
signals passing the filtering. This was attributed to the fact that these D&I signals were 
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too new, not standardized, and that projects had no guidelines for displaying them. 
Community members who wanted to spread adoption of a D&I signal put effort into 
piloting the D&I signal, gaining experience, and demonstrating that it was valuable so 
that they could educate others and increase understanding of the D&I signal.  
No, sadly I haven't seen a project display [a specific D&I signal]. I have not seen 
anyone do it yet. One of the projects in the [foundation] is trying very hard to 
have a system track the number of hours people are spending on different tasks 
in the project. That's the closest I've seen any project come to tracking the 
information needed to display this D&I signal. – [2D11] 
5.3.3 Organizational members adopted signals by making them part of 
organizational routines. 
In the CHAOSS project and its conference CHAOSScon, community 
members shared examples of how they incorporated cooperatively created signals in their 
organizations. An example of how using signals was not successful involved an 
organization that provided a dashboard with metrics to its community managers. The 
dashboard provided many signals about open source projects the organization was 
engaging with. For several months, the dashboard had not updated which no one had 
noticed, revealing that community managers were not using the signals from the 
dashboard. The takeaway from the example was that making signals available was not 
enough.  
The benefit that organizations seek from signals require that they are 
observed and acted upon regularly. Examples show that organizations are working to 
integrate signals about open source project health into their routines. One such example is 
shown in Figure 27, a slide from a CHAOSScon Europe 2019 presentation that shows 
that signals are observed weekly. This leads to the third key finding related to filtering 
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signals: Organizational members adopted signals by making them part of organizational 
routines. 
 
Figure 27. Slide from a CHAOSScon Europe 2019 presentation, showing that signals are made 
part of organizational routines. 
 
However, organizations were seen as lagging in adopting the use of D&I 
signals. Most informants did not have an organizational directive to use D&I signals but 
reported doing it on their own volition. Organizations used D&I signals through 
individual members who used signals themselves. D&I signals were ignored until 
someone within an organization took the lead to establish their use. The following quote 
is from an informant who acknowledged that they used D&I signals at their organization 
only after someone from outside the organization made them aware of the need to use 
D&I signals.  
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In the for-profit space especially, I see organizations getting involved only after 
they've received bad press. Like [company], while I was there and I was made 
aware of issues, problems, mistakes that we were making. While I broadly had 
support from everybody at the company to make the changes to make sure that 
we were doing the right thing, we only did that after people reported that we 
were doing the wrong thing. And I feel that's the industry in microcosm. I feel 
like companies are more reactive than they are proactive. It's unfortunate. – 
[1B15] 
Organizations who supported organizational members to use D&I signals 
were supporting, by proxy, the adoption of D&I signals. Signal adoption may have been 
an initiative of individual organizational members and not organization-wide, but 
organizations had an option not to support their employees. Informants shared stories of 
either case, including, in one extreme, seeing organizational members get fired because 
they were pushing for more D&I signals and, in another extreme, seeing organizational 
members using their organization’s resources and reputation to spread adoption D&I 
signals. The support of organizations is therefore a factor in whether signals pass through 
the filtering. The following quote highlights how organizational members were 
cooperating in open source projects with support of their organization to spread adoption 
of D&I signals. 
Organizations are involved insofar as they supported the people that work for 
them. For example, [Person 1] is employed currently by [company 1], which 
tends to be pretty supportive of their work. One of my colleagues, [Person 2], 
who is working with the Python community, is supported by [our company]. 
These people know that if they say something, like challenging an event to adopt 
a D&I signal, they won't get fired, like [Person 3] had been. In that sense, 
organizations were involved in distributing D&I signals. Organizations are 
generally made of people. Individual people in those organizations have pushed 
for D&I signals, and then the organizations have been happy enough to adopt 
them. – [1B10] 
For organizations to adopt using D&I signals, these needed to be concrete, 
had to deliver business value, and organizational members had to make changes within 
their organizations. Organizational members had an easier time convincing their 
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organization to support the use of D&I signals, when they could demonstrate an impact 
of those signals on an organization’s profitability. Experience and reports of others using 
D&I signals were facilitators in driving adoption. 
I have been driving this conversation wherever I go. I have been talking this 
year about that we need to measure diversity and recognize diverse forms of 
contribution. I know of other diversity leaders who are talking about this as well. 
It's becoming well accepted. Now we need to translate it into actual 
measurements and demonstrate the actual business or project benefits. – [1B11] 
Field observations and interviews found that the third process in creating 
signals was to promote signals, to drive adoption, and to avoid filtering signals. Filtering 
signals results in some D&I signals to be displayed and used while others are not. Table 
15 provides a summary of the key findings related to filtering signals. Cooperative 
signaling behavior is evident in filtering D&I signals because passing signals through 
filtering was facilitated by community members educating others on a D&I signal, 
working together to establish a good understanding of a D&I signal, and making a D&I 
signal part of organizational routines for others to use. 
 
 99 
Table 15. Key findings regarding filtering signals. 
Key Concept Description 
Supporting 
Evidence 
Education drove 
signal adoption 
Community members educated others to make them aware 
of a signal and teach them how to display or use a signal. 
Filtering signals involved educating different people to 
ensure that a signal was understood in the same way. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Experiences from 
piloting signals 
drove signal 
adoption 
Practical experiences and lessons learned from trying to use 
and display signals were valuable for educating others 
about a signal. Filtering signals involved sharing 
experiences from piloting signals. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Understanding of 
signal drove signal 
adoption 
Projects that understood the value of displaying a signal 
were seen more likely to adopt a signal. Likewise, 
organizations that understood the value of using a signal 
were seen more likely to adopt a signal. Filtering signals 
involved demonstrating the value that signals had. 
Interviews 
Routines for 
signals drove 
signal adoption 
Community members started to use signals themselves 
before establishing checklists and other means of making 
signals a regular part of their work. Filtering signals 
involved making signals part of routines. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
 
5.4 Displaying and Using Signals 
Community members engaging in the CHAOSS D&I Working Group and 
CHAOSS project more broadly wanted to learn about signals so that they can improve 
their signal display and signal use. In engaging with the CHAOSS project, community 
members shared their goals for signals and what experiences they had. From this 
exchange, signals were identified, evaluated, and filtered. It stands to reason, that 
cooperative signaling behavior influenced community members’ signal display and use.  
An indicator for the impact that the CHAOSS project had in industry was that 
industry professionals dedicated time and effort to participate in the CHAOSS project and 
CHAOSScon conferences to learn and discuss about open source project health signals. 
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The CHAOSS project was also regularly mentioned in blog posts and press releases 
(Figure 28).  
 
 
Figure 28. Screenshot of CHAOSS website with media coverage, showing that a wide variety of 
community members were writing about the CHAOSS project. Page version from April 30, 2019. 
 
An observable example of how D&I signals were started to be used was 
FINOS’ Program Health Check Rubric.32 The rubric contains different signals, including 
D&I signals, that needed to be observed about open source projects. The rubric also 
provided guidance on how to interpret signals. Every quarter, signals identified in the 
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rubric had to be shared with FINOS board members as part of FINOS’ organizational 
processes.  
 
 
Figure 29. Screenshot of FINOS' Program Health Check Rubric. Page version from March 27, 
2019. 
 
Despite some evidence that signal display and use were impacted by 
cooperative signaling behavior, the evidence is not sufficient to make definite claims. 
Signal creation is still in an early stage as the CHAOSS project started less than two years 
before key components of the present research were performed. While field observations 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
32 https://finosfoundation.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/FINOS/pages/93225748/Board+Reporting+and+Program+Health+Checks 
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indicate that cooperative signaling behavior may impact signal display and use, 
informants provided interesting insights during interviews about D&I signals specifically. 
D&I signals were believed to be connected to the health of an open source 
project. D&I signals informed that people of varied backgrounds and skills were 
welcomed and valued in a project. Contributions from people of different backgrounds 
and skills were positive indicators for project health because they improved the potential 
that a project will continue developing quality software. Because more diverse people 
were likely to join and continue to contribute when they were welcomed and included, 
displaying D&I signals had a positive impact on project health. Thus, D&I signals 
indicated and improved diversity and inclusivity of open source projects.  
The health of a project in my mind is a mature project; it is a well-rounded 
project. It doesn't have just code, it's well-documented, it's well-tested, it's well-
communicated, it has a good license and CLA information. All of these are 
necessary for a project to grow and be sustained, and, frankly, be successful and 
popular. And, if we do not recognize the people who are doing that work to 
make it a well-rounded and a well-maintained project, then I think we will suffer 
from a lack of growth in those areas. We need to recognize that work and attract 
the kind of people into the work that's necessary to mature open source. – 
[3B11] 
Looking at the display and use of D&I signals revealed that displaying D&I 
signals made projects appear healthier, that D&I signals were not evaluated by a return 
on investment, and that D&I signals had low importance in organizational decision 
making compared to other signals. 
5.4.1 Displaying D&I signals made projects appear healthier. 
Informants provided three main benefits for displaying D&I signals. Benefit 
1: Projects benefited from displaying signals because it created an awareness among 
community members. Discussions for displaying D&I signals covered basic questions of 
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whether a project should display D&I signals and what it hoped to gain from it. 
Discussions for displaying D&I signals identified what information would serve as a D&I 
signal and how community members could improve the D&I signal. A D&I signal might 
be a numeric value that demonstrated how well a project was doing and because it was 
public, bringing incentives to improve on it. By measuring and displaying such numeric 
values publicly, i.e., using them as signals, projects held themselves accountable for 
changes that they agreed on. 
There's nothing to encourage you to perform well on something like displaying 
it publicly. If you say that you're going to give away 20 diversity access tickets 
and you only end up giving away three, that's going to look really bad if all that's 
public. It's going to motivate you to actually perform on this numeric value. I'm 
actually a big fan of having numeric values in the public because I do think it 
encourages you to perform to those numeric values, even when there's a 
potential for being shamed later. – [3B4] 
Benefit 2: Projects and events benefited from displaying D&I signals because 
it attracted more diverse people, which improved perception of project health. People 
were more likely to join and participate if they felt welcomed. To demonstrate the benefit 
of displaying D&I signals, one informant explained a negative impact that not displaying 
D&I signals could have for projects. This explanation built on a common assumption that 
a diverse and inclusive project community was better equipped to develop quality 
software. 
If projects and events don't publish D&I signals and if they don't try to have 
representative speaker line-ups, then they're supporting the status quo, and the 
existing out-of-balance power dynamics that we have, and that's a problem. 
That's a cost, whether or not they're realizing this is a cost to them. That's a cost 
because with a monoculture, we lack critical insights and perspective as we 
make technical or product decisions. You know, if we have a community that 
doesn't have many people with disabilities in it or people with limited 
connectivity, then we may very well go and build software that isn't accessible, 
and only works on broadband modems. So, there's a serious cost to supporting 
the status quo. – [3D15] 
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Benefit 3: Projects and events displayed D&I signals to secure funding and 
organizational engagement. Displaying D&I signals for an event was to demonstrate to 
sponsors that an event was “diverse enough.” Sponsors might refrain from funding an 
event if it did not host a diverse set of well-known speakers. A project or event that was 
lacking D&I signals or had negative publicity might not be able to get organizations to 
support and participate. An organization might avoid associating with a project that could 
cause negative publicity for the organization. 
When event organizers contact sponsors or other people outside, they say, 
"These are the numbers of our conference that we had last year. We had X 
number of attendees and X speakers." Like different kind of statistic that they 
can show that the event was very diverse and having different kind of statistic 
that they can bring from the conference that was last year. Especially sponsors 
or people that care about the community, organizers show these kinds of signals 
to them. – [2B9] 
5.4.2 D&I signals were not evaluated by return on investment. 
Informants could not say whether healthy and unhealthy projects had a 
different return on investment. A reason was that D&I signals were not consistently 
displayed to provide a baseline within or across projects for comparison. Therefore, a 
cost-benefit-ratio could not be established. 
You have to have a baseline understanding of what your community health is. 
To have a return on investment, you need to know what needle you're moving 
and which way it's going. – [2D7] 
With regards to D&I signals, informants rejected the “return on investment” 
framing. They argued that a project benefited from engaging more diverse people and 
that signal display efforts were not a consideration. Addressing diversity and inclusion 
issues was seen as the right thing to do, regardless of its effort. Displaying D&I signals 
was one way to satisfy the ethical imperative. 
 105 
I really dislike the return on investment framing. I don't enjoy putting forward 
the business case for accessibility or diversity and inclusion, because D&I is the 
right thing to do, period. – [2D15] 
D&I signals were observed unchanging in the short-term. The demographic 
composition of a project community was seen as stable. Informants who conducted 
surveys found very little year-over-year difference, which was a concern for observing an 
impact of diversity and inclusion efforts because their impact was not easily observable 
in changes to D&I signals. With regards to return on investment, a concern was that any 
return would be measurable and observable only with a delay. 
We realized that communities don't change that fast. Every year, when we were 
collecting the data, the discussion was basically the same. That means that we 
were again finding similar numbers. They were perhaps a bit bigger or a bit 
smaller, but the population of women and so on were the same. – [3C3] 
5.4.3 D&I signals had low importance in organizational decision making 
compared to other signals. 
Diversity and inclusion, in general, and across the IT industry, was a topic 
that organizations were becoming more interested in. This nascent interest in diversity 
and inclusion by organizations was felt by projects, but evidence of organizations paying 
attention to individual D&I signals was scarce. Informants reported that their 
organizations valued diversity and inclusion but that it was not a focus. 
I don't know specifically about [D&I signal]. The organizations that I've been 
part of were looking at diversity and inclusion of events as something that's 
important. This being one element of it, I would think that it would be 
something we would look at. But it's such a small piece of the overall diversity 
and inclusion stuff that I'm not sure that this thing would tip the balance. – [4D4] 
D&I signals were less important than technical requirements in decisions 
about organizational engagements. Organizations might use D&I signals to sway 
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decisions that were borderline but influence of D&I signals was small. A D&I signal 
could serve as a knockout criterion but was not used to compare projects.  
I wonder if a company is thinking about using a technology like [project 1]. 
When they're weighing their options, and they're like: “Should we be all [project 
2] or does [project 1] make sense, or what about [project 3].” I wonder, do any 
of those companies want to know how diverse and inclusive our community is? 
Probably to some extent, because if they're going to be going to conferences, 
they do care if we're terrible people because they have to actually see us and 
work with us. But as far as the technology goes, do they care what percentage of 
the programmers working on it were under-represented minorities in tech? I 
don't know. – [4D13] 
Informants agreed that organizational decision making could not be made 
based on specific D&I signals because they were not reliably displayed by projects. 
When organizations looked at D&I signals, they would observe whether a project was 
displaying D&I signals. 
D&I signals do not influence decisions, to be honest. And that's partially 
because we're not systematic at looking at community health at all, right now. I 
would think that probably if we were to look at it, it would be binary: is this 
community addressing D&I signals in any systematic way. –[4D5] 
One informant provided the following rationale, explaining that companies 
only used D&I signals in their decision making to avoid becoming affiliated with a 
project that could generate negative publicity.  
People are going to start becoming uncomfortable giving money or being seen to 
give money to projects that either mark or completely go against the intention of 
code of conducts. I think you'll see more projects or grant programs or whatever, 
start to say: “Hey, I can't be associated with you with that stuff going on.” It'll 
probably be blunt and subtle. – [4B7] 
Established D&I signals became part of organizational routines that 
community members learned to execute. With the use of D&I signals becoming 
institutionalized, community members who newly learn about D&I signals did not know 
the background and history of how a D&I signal came to be. Nevertheless, these 
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community members are a component in cooperative signaling behavior even if they are 
at the tail end of it and have limited insight to it. 
I really don't know why D&I signals have become important. But certainly, in 
the for-profit world, when you look at diversity and inclusion, this is becoming a 
category. There seems to be a checklist item for it. – [1B18] 
Field observations and interviews indicated that signals were created to be 
displayed and used and that cooperative signaling behavior impacts the display and use of 
signals. Table 16 provides a summary of the key findings related to displaying and using 
signals. Cooperative signaling behavior is evident in displaying and using D&I signals 
because it directed the attention of community members as they interacted with each 
other. 
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Table 16. Key findings regarding displaying and using signals. 
Key Concept Description 
Supporting 
Evidence 
Cooperative 
signaling behavior 
influenced signal 
display and use 
Community members who displayed or used signals could 
learn how to do it better through cooperative signaling 
behavior. Displaying and using signals involved learning 
about a signal from cooperative signaling behavior. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
 
Signal display 
changed hidden 
quality 
Community members reported displaying and using signals 
to make the health of their projects appear better. 
Displaying and using signals involved working towards 
changing a hidden quality. 
Interviews 
Signals worked 
internally  
Signals were observed by community members who were 
members of the project that displayed signals. Displaying 
and using signals involved shaping the behavior of project 
members. 
Interviews 
Signals worked 
externally 
Signals were observed by community members who were 
not project members. Displaying and using signals involved 
attracting more community members, organizations, and 
funding for a project. 
Interviews 
Signal display 
effort was 
irrelevant 
The idea that effort to display a signal would determine 
which signals projects would display was rejected by 
informants. Displaying and using D&I signals was seen as 
an ethical imperative regardless of signal display effort. 
Interviews 
Signals were slow 
changing 
Signals were reported to be stable and slow changing, 
which impeded their use for short-term decision making. 
Displaying and using signals involved observing signals as 
they changed over time. 
Interviews 
Some signals were 
used more than 
others 
Organizations decided to engage with open source projects 
based more on technical signals and less on D&I signals. 
Displaying and using signals involved selecting which 
signals to pay attention to. 
Field Observations 
Interviews 
Prevalence of 
signal display was 
important for 
signal use 
Users of signals did not rely on signals that were not widely 
displayed and could, thus, not be used for comparison. 
Displaying and using signals involved observing whether 
others were also displaying or using a signal. 
Interviews 
Signal were 
requested to be 
displayed 
Users of signals incentivized projects to display signals, 
e.g., funders made signals part of their funding criteria. 
Displaying and using signals involved requesting signals to 
be displayed. 
Interviews 
Signals lived 
beyond cooperative 
signal creation 
People learned to display or use signals without learning the 
history of how a signal was cooperatively created. 
Displaying and using signals in day-to-day work involved 
moving beyond cooperative signal creation. 
Interviews 
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5.5 Summary of Findings 
Field observations and interviews showed that cooperative signaling behavior 
is the combination of activities by which senders and observers create signals and shape 
how they are displayed and used (Table 17). Signal creation is about proposing ideas for 
new signals, debating them, and incorporating different goals and perspectives. It is about 
developing shared methods of displaying signals, identifying and overcoming difficulties 
in displaying signals, and piloting them to better understand them. It is about educating 
each other, sharing experiences with signals, and working together to include signals in 
routines. Cooperative signaling behavior for creating signals occurs through the processes 
of identifying, evaluating, and filtering signals. In this, community members from 
projects and organizations help each other and create signals. After signals are created, it 
is about making decisions based on signals, requesting that signals be displayed, and 
shaping behavior by displaying signals.  
 
Table 17. An overview of activities involved in cooperative signaling behavior. 
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Identifying Signals 
- Proposing ideas for new signals 
- Debating proposed signals 
- Incorporating different goals and perspectives 
Evaluating Signals 
- Developing shared methods for displaying signals 
- Overcoming difficulties in displaying signals 
- Piloting signals to better understand them 
Filtering Signals 
- Educating others on signals 
- Sharing experiences  
- Including signals in routines 
Displaying and Using Signals 
- Shaping behavior by displaying signals  
- Making decisions based on signals 
- Requesting signals to be displayed 
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6 Discussion 
Open source projects are known to signal project health (Ho & Rai, 2017). 
Signaling theory research explains how signals are used to overcome information 
asymmetries (Connelly et al., 2011; Spence, 1974). However, the incentives in 
organizational engagement with open source projects to create signals match the 
incentives described for cooperative signaling behavior (Spence, 1974) providing a 
research context for critiquing signaling theory. As such, driving this research was the 
question of: How do open source projects and organizations create signals for open 
source project health? Below sections address the question, particularly in the context of 
open source project health and D&I signals. 
6.1 D&I Signals are Cooperatively Built to Shape Engagement 
Cooperative signaling behavior was supported by evidence. However, 
observations in the context of open source project health and D&I signals yielded 
interesting findings that were unexpected. Figure 30 shows the conceptual framework, 
identifying which parts of cooperative signaling behavior were supported, work 
differently, or were not supported with evidence. The discussion focuses on unexpected 
findings, highlighting that signals are cooperatively built to shape engagement and not to 
distinguish projects of high and low project health. 
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Figure 30. Color-coded conceptual framework: Blue (solid line) was supported by evidence as 
expected. Green (long dash dot line) was found to work different than expected: The D&I 
signal—health relationship is bi-directional. Red (dashed line) did not have enough evidence: 
Use of signals by organizations and use of project health in decision making. 
 
6.1.1 Supported: Cooperative Signaling Behavior and Signal Display 
As was expected, when signals are used to overcome an information 
asymmetry (Connelly et al., 2011), community members from within open source 
projects have to display signals because other community members would not have the 
necessary insight. However, they were not left alone with this responsibility but received 
help from community members from across other projects and organizations. The context 
of D&I signals was fruitful for exploring cooperative signaling behavior. 
It was expected that community members have an incentive to shape an 
informational structure (Spence, 1974). This expectation was supported because 
community members from open source projects and organizations were found to propose 
signals and develop them for a variety of reasons. They balanced trade-offs between 
difficulties and benefits for displaying D&I signals, as was expected (Hasson, 1997). The 
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creation of new signals was not the sole doing of either projects or organizations, but both 
worked together and benefitted from this cooperation. 
6.1.2 Different: The D&I Signals—Health Relationship 
The relationship between D&I signals and project health was different than 
expected. The expectation was that project health determines what signals are displayed 
because signaling theory often demonstrates signal credibility by demonstrating that a 
hidden quality is negatively correlated with signal display effort (Connelly et al., 2011). 
However, display effort for D&I signals was not determined by how welcoming and 
inclusive a project was (i.e., its hidden quality). Any effort to display D&I signals was 
seen as irrelevant, which supports that signals can be displayed for different motivations 
(Zerbini, 2017). Following an ethical imperative, projects expend the effort of displaying 
D&I signals, not to reflect their state of project health, but to improve their health. This 
indicates that D&I signals are a type of signal that derive credibility because they 
influence project health which corroborates that commitments to improve a hidden 
quality serve as credible signals (Hasson, 1997; Zerbini, 2017).  
Literature found that the same signal is sometimes reused for conveying 
similar information to make communication more efficient by having fewer signals that 
need to be recognized (Santana, 2014). With regards to D&I signals, the opposite seems 
to be true where diverse signals are displayed for similar information. A reason is that 
D&I signals are displayed, not to inform about, but to improve project health. Diverse 
D&I signals developed by the CHAOSS D&I Working Group draw attention to different 
ways of improving project health. While specific signals focus community members on 
specific improvements, observers do not benefit from the level of detail and combine 
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signals to use them. This indicates that signals displayed to change a hidden quality are 
not optimized for efficient communication. 
Literature suggested that senders choose to display positive signals and avoid 
negative signals (Connelly et al., 2011). However, informants stated that they wanted 
honest D&I signals, even if they were negative. Displaying a negative D&I signal was 
seen as better than not having a signal. A negative signal is displayed by community 
members to be observed by community members, shaping their interaction within a 
project and towards others. A negative signal motivates to improve and demonstrates to 
observers that community members are attentive to an issue. It had been suggested that 
senders may use signals to inform their behavior (Hasson, 1997; Karanges et al., 2018). 
The findings suggest that positive and negative signals are useful in such a context.  
6.1.3 Not Enough Evidence: Signal Use  
It was expected that organizations use D&I signals, which was not supported 
with enough evidence. Organizations do observe D&I signals, but different types of 
signals bear different levels of importance (Hasson, 1997). Both, technical and D&I 
signals indicate project health (Link & Germonprez, 2018) and findings show that 
organizations choose to engage in projects based on technical signals, thus confirming 
that D&I signals are considered after technical signals (Linåker et al., 2019). Findings 
suggested that D&I signals are not used by organizations to compare projects. One reason 
is that D&I signals inform how welcoming and inclusive a project is, which is not 
quantified and does not lend itself to a comparison. However, organizations sometimes 
use D&I signals to avoid engaging with projects that may result in negative publicity. 
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Nevertheless, organizations engage in cooperative signaling behavior. They 
support their employees to work as community members on identifying, evaluating, and 
filtering D&I signals. However, use of D&I signals by organizations was little observed. 
Thus, there was insufficient evidence to determine differences between displaying fewer 
or more signals (Wang et al., 2018) and how corroborating or conflicting signals impact 
decision making (Miyazaki et al., 2005; Worsham & Gatrell, 2005). Future research 
could address these open questions as more organizations begin to use D&I signals. For 
example, D&I signals are starting to be used as a funding criterion by organizations for 
funding open source projects. 
6.2 Creation of Signals by Identifying, Evaluating, and Filtering Signals 
Prior signaling theory research explained how senders and observers 
overcome an information asymmetry but did not explain how signals were created 
(Connelly et al., 2011). The present research contributes to signaling theory by describing 
how signals are created through cooperative signaling behavior (Spence, 1974). When 
community members of open source projects and organizations engage in signaling 
activities, they advance signals. Community members who are seen to be most engaged 
were typically those who benefitted most from having signals, which supports that 
community members who gain from shaping an informational structure engage in 
cooperative signaling behavior (Spence, 1974). In cooperative signaling behavior, 
senders and observers engage together in identifying, evaluating, and filtering signals, 
which confirms that communication between senders and observers is essential to 
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establishing new signals (Santana, 2014). Findings described three processes through 
which cooperative signaling behavior creates new signals, summarized in Table 18. 
 
Table 18. Summary of cooperative signaling behavior processes that create signals. 
Cooperative Signaling Behavior: Processes for Creating Signals 
Identifying Signals 
Community members engage in conversations about how to best represent 
or influence a hidden quality, collecting proposed signals. 
Evaluating Signals 
Community members advance methods for displaying proposed signals, 
overcome challenges for displaying signals, and pilot them. Initial 
experimental implementations provide experiences for evaluating signals 
and learning what meaning people ascribe to them. 
Filtering Signals 
Senders and observers incorporate a signal in their processes or dismiss 
them, based on what was learned during the evaluation of signals. 
 
Identifying signals is a process in which community members engage in 
conversations about how to best represent or influence project health through signals. 
Community members propose a variety of signals because they each represent a different 
way to understand project health. Many signals are in early development because it is 
challenging to precisely define what information to display and how it relates to project 
health. Only when community members give meaning to these potential signals (Santana, 
2014) can they inform organizational engagements. 
Evaluating signals is a process in which community members advance 
methods for displaying proposed signals, overcome challenges for displaying signals, and 
pilot them. Initial experimental implementations provide experiences for evaluating 
signals and learning what meaning people ascribe to them. Senders evaluate a signal 
based on how easy it is to display and what benefits to expect from displaying it. When 
community members convince project members to display untested D&I signals, they 
innovate and demonstrate how display is possible. Observers evaluate a signal based on 
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what objectives it helps to achieve, which confirms that people pay attention to signals 
that they learn will help (Spence, 1974), for example to do the right thing or to avoid 
negative publicity.  
Filtering signals is a process where senders and observers incorporate a 
signal in their practices or by which they may dismiss a signal (Gomulya & Mishina, 
2017). Choosing to incorporate or to dismiss a signal is influenced by benefits of 
compared to difficulties to display a signal (Hasson, 1997). Conditions that help a 
community member filter a signal include positive experience with a signal, 
demonstrated benefits of a signal, and a communal understanding of a signal. Community 
members educate senders and observers of a potential signal by speaking about them at 
conferences, publishing blog posts, engaging projects, and discussing in organizations. 
For example, as a filtered signal “event speaker demographics” is used to attract more 
speakers, attendees, and funders to events. The event speaker signal is also routinely 
displayed by event organizers and used in organizational funding decisions. While signals 
are filtered to become part of communal and organizational practices, it remains 
individual community members who display and use signals. As signals are made 
integral parts of organizational processes, community members not involved in filtering 
signals may not know why they are expected to use a signal. Instead, they perceive it as a 
“check-box” to tick, explaining why people have been observed to engage in signaling 
behavior without perceiving it as such (Spence, 1974).  
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6.3 Displaying and Using Signals from Cooperative Signaling Behavior 
Cooperative signaling behavior creates signals with the aim to display and 
use them. The research provided limited evidence about how cooperatively created 
signals are displayed and used. This is not surprising considering that the CHAOSS D&I 
Working Group had started educating others about D&I signals only three months before 
key components of the research were performed. One instance that did demonstrate the 
display and use of cooperative signals is the OpenStack Gender Diversity Report.
 33
 The 
authors of the report were active members of the CHAOSS D&I Working Group and 
discussed ideas for expanding the focus of their report before implementing them. An 
addition to the 2018 report was a section on mentorship programs with signals created in 
the CHAOSS D&I Working Group.  
Field observations from the research inform where community members were 
starting to display and use signals. Within the CHAOSS project, a focus of work is on 
implementing signals in software (Figure 31). Two CHAOSS software projects – Augur34 
and GrimoireLab
35
 – put pressure on methods for displaying signals because they 
translate proposed signals into software. Learnings from this translation are used to 
improve the signal definition. Implemented signals are then displayed by community 
members who use this software to understand the health of their projects. For example, 
Twitter
36
 is experimenting signals with Augur. Cregit, the third CHAOSS software 
                                                 
 
33 https://superuser.openstack.org/articles/2018-gender-diversity-report/ 
34 https://github.com/chaoss/augur 
35 https://github.com/chaoss/grimoirelab 
36 http://twitter.augurlabs.io/ 
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project, can be used to display signals that have not yet been the focus of discussions in 
the CHAOSS project. 
 
 
Figure 31. Screenshot of CHAOSS website showing the three CHAOSS software projects: Augur, 
Cregit, and GrimoireLab. 
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The findings suggest that signals are made part of organizational routines. 
With project health as a critical consideration for organizations, it can be expected that 
organizations learn from cooperative signaling behavior and advance their use of signals. 
This is evident from presentations that organizational members gave at CHAOSScon 
about their organizations’ use of signals. A directly observable example is FINOS’ 
Program Health Check Rubric.
37
 The rubric contains different signals that need to be 
observed about open source projects and provides guidance on what actions the signals 
inform. The creator of the rubric made signals part of FINOS’ organizational routines. It 
cannot be known to which extend such a rubric would have been created without 
cooperative signaling behavior in the CHAOSS project. However, available evidence 
suggests that cooperative signaling behavior influenced how signals are displayed and 
used. 
 
                                                 
 
37 https://finosfoundation.atlassian.net/wiki/spaces/FINOS/pages/93225748/Board+Reporting+and+Program+Health+Checks 
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7 Reflection on Assurance Case Method  
The assurance case method for qualitative research provides rigor in creating 
data collection strategies (Gandhi & Lee, 2009). Gandhi and Lee (2009) positioned the 
assurance case method as a structured way to document propositions of a case study and 
explicitly connect them to data. Gandhi et al. (2018) demonstrated that the assurance case 
can also be useful outside of a case study to develop an interview protocol. The present 
study used the assurance case to develop an interview protocol as an integral part of the 
overall method. My experience confirms the benefit of a rebuttal-claim-question-
evidence logic that forces a researcher to develop a rationale for each interview question 
and anticipate evidence. The visual assurance case focuses conversations with research 
team members and facilitates critical reflection that can reveal overlooked rebuttals and 
new interview questions. However, these benefits come with pitfalls. 
One pitfall is to expand the level of detail of an assurance case beyond what 
is needed to answer a research question (Goodenough, Weinstock, & Klein, 2015). It is 
tempting to unpack an inner logic of an assurance case through additional levels of sub-
claims and rebuttals. However, additional levels of claims result in more interview 
questions. A downside is an increasing burden on an interviewer to manage more 
questions, even if only to skip them. Instead, it is beneficial to focus on developing open-
ended questions. Throughout several interviews, an interviewer identifies new follow-up 
questions to ask (Seidman, 2006) even without a detailed assurance case.  
Another pitfall is formulating leading interview questions by simply phrasing 
the connected claim from the assurance case as a question. For example, for a claim 
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“Informants believe that incentives for open source projects and organizations were 
balanced” an obvious question is “Do you believe that incentives for open source projects 
and organizations were balanced?” Leading questions have limited value for a qualitative 
study and should be replaced with open-ended questions that enable informants to 
explore an answer (Creswell, 2013; Seidman, 2006; Spradley, 2016). To conclude the 
example, I formulated the interview question as “How were incentives for open source 
projects and organizations balanced in the design of the metric?” Therefore, a good use of 
the assurance case informs an interviewer about evidence an open-ended question is 
expected to yield which guides formulating follow-up questions during an interview.  
A third pitfall is to present an analysis informed by engineering practices 
(Goodenough et al., 2015) that summarizes findings to determine how well evidence 
supports claims in the assurance case. Such a rigid structure is a good intermediary step 
in qualitative data analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994) but breaks with conventions for 
presenting results in narrative form (van Maanen, 1988). A possible solution was 
explored by including references to the assurance case from the finding’s presentation. 
However, as theoretical contributions were developed, the link was difficult to maintain 
and removed at last. Having initially presented interview data by how it informed 
different branches in the assurance case, provided rigor in analyzing the data and 
provided insights into the evidence for the concepts of the conceptual framework. 
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8 Contributions and Implications 
8.1 Critique of Signaling Theory: Creation of Signals Through 
Cooperative Signaling Behavior 
This study provides a critique (Mathiassen et al., 2012) of signaling theory 
(Spence, 1974). Spence (1974) theorized that senders and observers have incentives to 
cooperate and create signals. However, signaling theory literature has focused on how 
signals impact decision making, not the creation of signals (Connelly et al., 2011). This 
study documents one instance in which senders and observers do engage in cooperative 
signaling behavior to create signals. We learned that cooperative signaling behavior 
works through identifying, evaluating, and filtering signals. This is a critique of signaling 
theory by demonstrating that signals are created. An implication for signaling theory 
research is that scholars should be mindful of where signals came from and why they 
were created. The findings from this study provide an expanded lens to investigate 
signaling behavior while considering where signals originate from. 
8.2 Critique of Signaling Theory: The Signal–Hidden Quality 
Relationship 
Signaling theory assumes that a signal is used to convey information about a 
hidden quality (Spence, 1974). A common argument for why a signal is credible refers to 
a correlation between the effort to display a signal and the hidden quality (Connelly et al., 
2011; Spence, 1974). Such a cost-benefit-analysis was not supported by the findings. 
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Informants rejected a cost-benefit-analysis because they argued that displaying D&I 
signals was ethically the right thing to do, regardless of signal display effort. An 
implication for signaling theory is to revisit assumptions about what makes a credible 
signal. Hasson (1997) theorized in the context of biological signaling that signals are 
credible in collaborative engagements when senders and observes use signals to 
coordinate their cooperation and lack incentives to deceive. Signal credibility in 
cooperative engagements was not the focus of this study but emerged as an interesting 
observation. An implication for signaling theory research in social sciences is to 
investigate signal credibility in cooperative engagements. 
Signaling theory literature describes signals to inform outside observers about 
a hidden quality. The findings suggest, however, that signals are used internally and work 
towards improving a hidden quality. Using signals not to signal to outside observers but 
to internal observers has been theorized (Karanges et al., 2018). Karanges et al. (2018) 
argued that executives in organizations signal to employees to influence their behavior. 
Findings of the present study support that members of an organization can display signals 
for internal use to improve a hidden quality. A related observation was the use of many 
similar signals for the same hidden quality. In contrast to displaying few signals to 
efficiently convey information about a hidden quality (Santana, 2014), many signals may 
be needed to efficiently influence a hidden quality. An implication is that more research 
is needed to uncover how signals influence a hidden quality. 
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8.3 Critique of the Assurance Case Method as a Tool for Developing an 
Interview Protocol 
A critique of the assurance case method as a tool for developing an interview 
protocol is based on reflecting upon its application in this study. Use of the assurance 
case method for qualitative research had been proposed (Gandhi & Lee, 2009) and 
demonstrated (Gandhi et al., 2018). The present study appreciated the rigor that the 
assurance case method introduced into the development of an interview protocol. 
However, three pitfalls were identified, and solutions were developed. First, the 
assurance case should be limited to necessary elements when formulating interview 
questions. Second, extra effort is required to formulate open-ended questions and to avoid 
leading questions that speak too closely to an associated claim. Third, rigor in the 
analysis of data can stem from organizing data to match the structure of the assurance 
case, but the analysis needs to continue and move to a structure that informs beyond the 
assurance case. 
8.4 Implications for Organizational Engagement with Open Source 
Projects 
Open source projects are cooperative in nature where community members 
self-organize to solve problems (Kelty, 2008). Organizational engagements with open 
source projects are also cooperative in nature where otherwise competing organizations 
work together on non-differentiating problems (Germonprez, Allen, et al., 2013). One of 
the shared problems was signaling project health (Link & Germonprez, 2018) and 
cooperative signaling behavior was a cooperative approach to this problem. A common 
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theme appears to be emerging across research on organizational engagement with open 
source projects: When problems arise, best practices are developed cooperatively with 
open source projects and organizations. Cooperative signaling behavior is the latest 
example for developing best practices for the shared signaling problem. Other examples 
include: the SPDX standard as a best practice to explicate license obligations for the 
shared problem of license compliance (Gandhi et al., 2018), the OpenChain project for 
best practices in organizations for the shared problem of compliance routines, and the CII 
Best Practices Badge for best practices for the shared problem of security. Enumeration 
of observations as an inductive approach is insufficient to make a determinate claim. 
However, a trend appears to emerge. Organizations that engage in an open source 
development model appear to be keen to also engage in similar cooperative settings for 
developing shared best practices. The implication is that research is needed to compare 
best practices development in organizational engagements with open source projects and 
other ways of best practices development.  
8.5 Implications for Financing Open Source Work 
Because signals influence decisions (Connelly et al., 2011), it can be 
expected that cooperatively created signals effect financing of work in open source 
projects. The findings suggested that some funders are making signals mandatory in their 
funding criteria. When funding of open source work is conceptualized as a marketplace, 
then attracting funds may require that projects display attractive signals. This is similar to 
how publicly traded companies send signals that influence their stock price (Zerbini, 
2017). Open source projects that engaged in cooperative signaling behavior may have a 
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better understanding of available signals that could attract funding. An implication is that 
signals need to be better understood, possibly through cooperative signaling behavior, 
with regards to how they influence funding opportunities for open source projects. 
 Conversely, signals about how much funds an open source project receives 
and pays out to contributors may also serve as signals about project health (Link et al., 
2019). However, market places for funding open source work are fast changing and 
newly emerging. An implication is that open source projects and organizations may 
determine through cooperative signaling behavior how market signals apply to open 
source projects. 
8.6 Implications for Compliance 
Organizations are concerned with compliance to reduce risk (Ihara, 2014). 
Through cooperative signaling behavior, organizations can learn which signals can 
indicate risks. One signal that organizations may pay attention to is the Core 
Infrastructure Initiative Best Practices Badge.
38
 Open source projects can self-certify and 
then display the badge as a signal of following best practices for reducing risk. The 
development of the badge could be likened to cooperative signaling behavior. In 
developing the badge, open source projects and organizations collected ideas for what 
best practices are, evaluated those ideas, and filtered them. The resulting check-list of 
best practices is what projects certify against. The badge itself serves as a signal. A more 
in-depth study would be needed to empirically verify whether the CII Best Practices 
Badge is another instance of cooperative signaling behavior. An implication is that 
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organizations can engage in cooperative signaling behavior to create signals for 
understanding the risks associated with open source projects. 
The CHAOSS project is starting a new CHAOSS Risk Working Group
39
 in 
2019 that focuses on signals concerning, for example, business risk, licensing risk, code 
quality risk, transparency risk, and security risk. The formation of the CHAOSS Risk 
Working Group on the one hand indicates that cooperative signaling behavior for 
compliance may be important and on the other hand provides a field site for studying this 
phenomenon.  
8.7 Implications for Standards Setting 
The way cooperative signaling behavior creates signals and facilitates 
implementation has similarities to how standards are created in open source projects, with 
signals as the standard. Like standard setting (Gandhi et al., 2018), routines for displaying 
and using signals are shaped through discussions and learnings that implementors and 
users provide. A common theme across standard setting and cooperative signaling 
behavior is that ideas come from a variety of contexts to solve a variety of problems. 
However, once a proposed idea enters into a standard, it increases the complexity of the 
standard (ibid.). Users of the standard have to cope with the complexity, even when using 
only a portion of the standard (ibid.). In contrast, in cooperative signaling behavior, a 
signal can be filtered out and thus not increase complexity in signaling a hidden quality 
because it is neither displayed nor used. Indeed, a wish for more modularity and optional 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
38 https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/ 
39 https://github.com/chaoss/wg-risk 
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aspects of a standard was expressed by users of a standard developed in open source 
(ibid.). An implication for standard setting is that modular standards may be better suited 
for open source development than fully integrated standards.  
In the SPDX project, organizations and open source projects engaged in 
developing a standard for expressing license obligations and related best practices 
(Gandhi et al., 2018). Open source projects adopted these best practices and, for example, 
used SPDX-License-Shortidentifiers to express licenses at the file level. Organizations 
can observe the presence of license short identifiers as a signal and for example infer that 
evaluating licensing risks associated with such a project may require less effort because 
licenses are easier to identify. In the SPDX case, cooperative development of a standard 
has resulted in a signal. The implication is that cooperative standard development may 
entail cooperative signaling behavior. 
8.8 Implications for Open Source Project Health 
Open source project health is important to open source projects and 
organizations (Linåker et al., 2019). However, a shared method for assessing project 
health is missing (Link & Germonprez, 2018). The findings showed that shared methods 
for displaying signals about project health are created through cooperative signaling 
behavior. Someone who wants to know more about project health signals and learns 
about them from others is also engaging in cooperative signaling behavior. Shared 
methods for assessing open source project health therefore emerge from cooperative 
signaling behavior. The implication is that cooperative signaling behavior is a solution to 
improve identifying project health.  
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Project health can be assessed in the three dimensions: community, code, 
resources (Arantes & Freire, 2011). D&I signals are part of the community dimension 
(Linåker et al., 2019). D&I signals were found to be nuanced which supports that the 
community dimension is complex. The focus of this study was not on specific D&I 
signals but on how open source projects and organizations move past the complexity to 
create D&I signals that are meaningful. The findings showed that D&I signals emerged 
from cooperative signaling behavior. While D&I signals mentioned in this research give 
an idea of what D&I signals are, they only served to reveal the creation of signals. D&I 
signals are not well defined in this research nor intended to comprise a comprehensive list. 
The implication is that D&I signals were identified as important but that more research is 
needed to understand D&I signals, especially as they become more widely displayed and 
used. 
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9 Limitations 
This research focused on organizational engagements with open source 
projects. Informants served organizational and communal interests. The role of signaling 
and specifically cooperative signaling behavior may be different in an open source 
context with little or no organizational engagement. Moreover, cooperative signaling 
behavior may work different in other contexts. It may be interesting to investigate 
cooperative signaling behavior in contexts that do not have cooperation as a core value 
like open source does. 
Community members take on many different roles within open source 
projects and organizations. In explaining cooperative signaling behavior, these roles were 
not differentiated to avoid distracting readers with superfluous details. Future research 
can investigate how different roles in projects and organizations affect cooperative 
signaling behavior. For example, what do community managers, open source program 
officers, developers, or marketers contribute to cooperative signaling behavior and gain 
from it? 
Additionally, the interview protocol for this research was built on a prevalent 
idea that signal display effort determines signal credibility. Signal display effort turned 
out to be irrelevant and signal credibility was derived from a project’s commitment. 
However, the interview protocol was not adjusted because data collection had been 
completed when this discovery was made. Future research can investigate signaling that 
relies less on signal display effort and more on other signal credibility mechanisms. 
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Finally, D&I signals in open source are still emerging. The concept “signal 
use” could not be supported. Inferences were made throughout findings and discussion, 
but concrete evidence is missing. It may be interesting to investigate cooperative 
signaling behavior in a more advanced context where all concepts of the framework are 
observable. 
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10 Conclusions 
This study critiqued signaling theory by advancing our understanding of 
cooperative signaling behavior and describing it in the context of open source project 
health in organizational engagements with open source projects. Signals were found to be 
created through cooperative signaling behavior, specifically through processes of 
identifying, evaluating, and filtering signals. Signaling was thereby shown to have 
cooperative elements previously only suspected (Spence, 1974). Signaling theory 
research should look beyond existing signals and understand how those signals came to 
be before they facilitated interactions between senders and observers.  
Overall, value of the engaged scholarship approach cannot be overstated. 
This research project contributed to practice by collecting details about D&I signals and 
sharing them with the CHAOSS D&I Working Group. As such, the researcher engaged in 
cooperative signaling behavior and was able to report on it with an inside perspective. 
The thick description of the CHAOSS D&I Working Group was shared with community 
members who found a blog to publish it
40
 and a podcast to promote it via an interview.
41
 
More broadly, the impact of cooperative signaling behavior is starting to show as projects 
and organizations report efforts to display and use signals. Future research will be needed 
to investigate how cooperative signaling behavior not only creates signals but influences 
signal display and signal use. 
                                                 
 
40 https://thenewstack.io/how-chaoss-di-can-help-diversity-in-the-open-source-community/ 
41 https://thenewstack.io/how-chaoss-measures-diversity-windows-gets-a-proper-terminal/ 
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Open source projects are evolving and signaling plays an important role in 
shaping this evolution. Project members display signals that draw attention to issues and 
consequently change behavior of project members. Changing behavior of project 
members is different from signals attracting or retaining project members (Ho & Rai, 
2017). An implication for open source projects is that establishing signals can focus their 
project members to improve project health and create visibility about it. Projects that 
innovate novel signals have an extra burden of trial and error but are first to benefit. 
Especially larger projects may benefit from this introspection and resulting change. 
Future research may investigate whether cooperative signaling behavior is more likely to 
occur in some types of projects. A need for cooperative signals appears to drive the 
CHAOSS project to start new working groups that focus now on: D&I, Growth-Maturity-
Decline, Risk, Value, and Common Metrics.  An implication for organizations is that if 
they want to use any kind of signals about open source project health, they may need to 
allow their employees to work with open source projects to create those signals and 
promote their display. 
Cooperative signaling behavior may not be uniform. For example, D&I 
signals for events and projects were developed within the same timeframe but reached 
different levels of adoption. An open question is whether events and projects are different 
signaling contexts in which cooperative signaling behavior works differently. The context 
of events has a limited time frame for planning and organizing an event, resulting in a 
short learning cycle to observe whether displayed signals attract more diverse speakers, 
attendees, and sponsors. In contrast, the context of projects is an ongoing engagement 
where changes are slow to manifest, signals are hard to define, and learning cycles are 
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longer. Length of a learning cycle may influence how fast signals mature. Within these 
different contexts, D&I signals for events have similarities with signals in transaction 
contexts where decisions are made once and D&I signals for events have similarities with 
signals in cooperative environments where coordination is a primary intention of senders 
and observers (Hasson, 1997). Institutional theory may provide an interesting lens to 
uncover specific actors, dynamics, and how D&I signals are shaped through institutional 
constraints. 
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Appendix A: Visual Assurance Case (continued)
  
  
Top-Level Claim C0: 
A specific D&I signal was identified, 
evaluated, and filtered by open source 
projects and organizations.
Inference Rule IR0: 
(Quality of Interview Data)
Informants have experience with and 
pay attention to D&I in open source and 
organizations.
Sub-Claim C0.1: 
Informants can describe their 
experience with D&I in open source.
Question Q0.1: 
What is your experience with diversity 
and inclusion in open source?
Rebuttal R0.1:
Unless informants have no experience 
with D&I.
Sub-Claim C0.1.1.1: 
Informants have a personal interest in 
open source and thus pay attention.
Question Q0.1.1.1: 
What is your personal interest in 
diversity and inclusion in open source? 
Evidence E0.1:
Replies showing that informants have a 
background in D&I in open source and 
are knowledgeable to talk about it.
Rebuttal R0.1.1:
Unless informants do not pay attention 
to D&I in open source.
Sub-Claim C0.1.1.2: 
Informants have worked on D&I 
initiative.
Question Q0.1.1.2: 
Have you been involved in a diversity 
and inclusion effort within an open 
source project?
Evidence E0.2:
Replies showing that informants have a 
background in D&I in open source and 
have worked with it.
Evidence E0.3:
Replies showing the signal evolved and 
was advanced by open source projects 
and organizations.
Claim C0.2: 
Informants report that they represent 
open source projects and organizations.
Question Q0.2: 
Tell me about yourself? What 
organizations and open source projects 
are you affiliated with?
Rebuttal R0.2:
Unless informants consider only one 
perspective, open source project or 
organization, not both.
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Top-Level Claim C0: 
A specific D&I signal was created by 
open source projects and organizations.
Sub-Claim C1.2: 
Informants believe that incentives for 
open source projects and organizations 
were balanced.
Question Q1.2: 
How were incentives for open source 
projects and organizations balanced in 
the design of _the metric_?
Rebuttal R1.2:
Unless incentives for open source 
projects and organizations were not 
balanced.
Sub-Claim C1.2.1: 
Informants have no concerns about 
incentives created by the signal.
Question Q1.2.1: 
What are typical concerns for using 
_the metric_?
Evidence E1.2:
Replies showing who was involved in 
the development of the signal and how 
they balanced incentives.
Rebuttal R1.2.1:
Unless concerns about the signal 
indicate that incentives are imbalanced.
 Rebuttal R1:
(Cooperative Signaling Behavior)
Unless open source projects and 
organizations do not work together on 
the signal.
Sub-Claim C1.1: 
Informants can describe the history of 
the signal.
Question Q1.1: 
How has _the metric_ developed over 
time?
Sub-Claim C1: 
Informants can name what open source 
projects and organizations were 
involved in advancing the signal.
Question Q1: 
What open source projects and 
organizations advanced _the metric_?
Inference Rule IR1: 
Informants can reconstruct the 
development of the signal.
Rebuttal R1.1:
Unless informants are unaware of the 
history of the signal.
Evidence E1.1:
Replies outlining the history of the 
signal.
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Top-Level Claim C0: 
A specific D&I signal was created by 
open source projects and organizations.
Rebuttal R2.3: (Signal Honesty)
Unless the signal is gamed.
Rebuttal R2: 
(Signal Display) 
Unless projects have no intention of 
preparing and displaying the signal.
Claim C2: 
Informants believe that open source 
projects want to prepare and display 
the signal.
Question Q2: 
What motivations do open source 
projects have for displaying _the 
metric_?
 Rebuttal R2.1: (Signal Fit)
Unless a positive signal can be prepared 
with the same effort by healthy and 
unhealthy projects.
Rebuttal R2.2: (Signal Benefit)
Unless displaying the signals does not 
provide any benefit for the open source 
project.
Rebuttal R2.0:
Unless the signal is prepared and 
displayed by a third party or 
organization.
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Claim C2: 
Informants believe that open source 
projects want to prepare and display 
the signal.
Rebuttal R2.0:
Unless the signal is prepared and 
displayed by a third party or 
organization.
Sub-Claim C2.0: 
Informants can identify an open source 
project that prepares and displays the 
signal.
Question Q2.0: 
What open source projects have you 
seen display _the metric_? 
Evidence E2.1:
Replies showing that open source 
projects prepare and display the signal.
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Claim C2: 
Informants believe that open source 
projects want to prepare and display 
the signal.
 Rebuttal R2.1: (Signal Fit)
Unless a positive signal can be prepared 
with the same effort by healthy and 
unhealthy projects.
Sub-Claim C2.1.1: 
Informants can describe the process of 
preparing and displaying the signal.
Question Q2.1.1: 
What is a method for collecting _the 
metric_? 
Sub-Claim C2.1.2: 
Informants believe that a positive signal 
is more difficult to prepare for 
unhealthy projects.
Question Q2.1.2: 
What characteristics of an open source 
project impede or facilitate the 
collection of _the metric_?
Evidence E2.3:
Replies showing that it is difficult to 
prepare an incorrect signal.
Evidence E2.2:
Replies showing how the signal is 
prepared and displayed.
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Claim C2: 
Informants believe that open source 
projects want to prepare and display 
the signal.
Sub-Claim C2.2: 
Informants believe that displaying the 
signal benefits the project.
Question Q2.2: 
Have you seen any results for open 
source projects that display _the 
metric_?
Evidence E2.4:
Replies showing that benefits exist for  
displaying the signal.
Rebuttal R2.2: (Signal Benefit)
Unless displaying the signals does not 
provide any benefit for the open source 
project.
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Rebuttal R2.3: (Signal Honesty)
Unless the signal is gamed.
Sub-Claim C2.3: 
Informants do not believe that the 
signal is being gamed.
Question Q2.3: 
Have you seen _the metric_ gamed?
Rebuttal R2.3.1: 
Unless benefits for gaming the signal 
outweigh the costs.
Claim C2: 
Informants believe that open source 
projects want to prepare and display 
the signal.
Sub-Claim C2.3.1: 
Informants believe that the cost 
outweigh the benefits for gaming 
Diversity and Inclusion singals.
Question Q2.3.1: 
What is the return on investment for an 
open source project from displaying 
_the metric_?
Evidence E2.5:
Replies showing that healthy projects 
have a better cost-benefit-ratio.
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Top-Level Claim C0: 
A specific D&I signal was created by 
open source projects and organizations.
Rebuttal R3.1:
Unless informants have experienced a 
breakdown of the signal.
Sub-Claim C3.1: 
Informants can identify the limits of the 
signal.
Question Q3.1: 
What are typical concerns when using 
_the metric_ for open source project 
health?
Evidence E3.1:
Replies showing the use of the signal to 
inform open source project health and 
the limitations therein.
Rebuttal R3: 
(Signal Definition) 
 Unless the signal does not inform open 
source project health.
Claim C3: 
Informants can explain how the signal 
connects to open source project health.
Question Q3: 
How would you, if at all, use _the 
metric_ in a conversation about the 
health of an open source project?
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Top-Level Claim C0: 
A specific D&I signal was created by 
open source projects and organizations.
Sub-Claim C4.2: 
Informants know that their 
organizations use the signal in decision 
making.
Question Q4.2: 
Please describe an example where your 
organization uses _the metric_ in 
decision making?
Rebuttal R4: 
(Signal Use)
Unless the signal is ignored by 
organizations.
Evidence E4.1:
Replies showing that organizations pay 
attention to the signal.
Rebuttal R4.2.1: (Competing Signals)
Unless the signal is less important than 
other signals.
Sub-Claim C4.2.1: 
Informants can compare the signal with 
competing signals.
Question Q4.2.1: 
How important is _the metric_ for 
decision making in comparison to other 
considerations?
Evidence E4.2:
Replies showing the importance of the 
signal in decision making compared to 
other signals.
Claim C4.1: 
Informants know that their 
organizations pay attention to the 
signal.
Question Q4.1: 
To what extent does your organization 
pay attention to _the metric_?
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Appendix B: Interview Protocol 
 Assurance Case Reference: Interview Question (IRB #: 693-18-EX) 
Intro: Getting to know the informant – understanding the context. 
Context 
Q0.2: Tell me about yourself? What organizations and open source projects are you 
affiliated with? 
Experience Q0.1: What is your experience with diversity and inclusion in open source? 
Interest 
Q0.1.1.1: What is your personal interest in diversity and inclusion in open source? (What 
are you paying attention to?) 
Use 
Q0.1.1.2: Have you been involved in a diversity and inclusion effort within an open source 
project? (If yes: How has this changed your perspective of D&I in OSS?) 
Metrics 
Q-tc: Walk me through a typical diversity and inclusion metric conversation? (Who is 
involved? What do they talk about? Why do they talk about it?) 
Start Study: Focus on one signal [Share screen with the metric name on it to keep participant on track] 
Focus 
Q0: I would like to focus our interview on a specific metric. Which diversity and inclusion 
_metric_ would you like to focus on? (Maybe one you are most familiar with?) 
Signals: Metric as signal of open source project health 
Health 
indicator 
Q3: How would you use _the metric_ in a conversation about the health of an open source 
project? 
Limitation Q3.1: What are typical concerns when using _the metric_ for open source project health? 
Signal Display (more questions, because it may inform CHAOSS D&I Working Group resource pages) 
Who displays Q2.0: What open source projects have you seen display _the metric_? 
Gaming Q2.3: Have you seen _the metric_ gamed? 
Process Q2.1.1: What is a method for collecting _the metric_? 
Health 
correlation 
Q2.1.2: What characteristics of an open source project impede or facilitate the collection of 
the metric? (Is it harder for an unhealthy project to prepare a good-looking metric?) 
OSS 
motivations 
Q2: What motivations do open source projects have for displaying _the metric_? What 
impact would a project have to expect when starting to display _the metric_? 
OSS benefits 
Q2.2: Have you seen any results for open source projects that display _the metric_? (Any 
benefits?) 
Effort / benefit 
Q2.3.1: What is the return on investment for an open source project from displaying _the 
metric_? (Long-term backlash if falsely displayed?) 
Signal Use 
Attention Q4.1: To what extent does your organization pay attention to _the metric_? 
Use 
Q4.2: Please describe an example where your organization uses _the metric_ in decision 
making? 
Importance 
Q4.2.1: How important is _the metric_ for decision making in comparison to other 
considerations? (What are those other influences or metrics?) 
Cooperative Signaling Behavior  
(who all was involved in the creation of this metric, what was its evolution, who suggested it, who adopted it … ?) 
History Q1.1: How has _the metric_ developed over time? Where did it start? How has it changed? 
Who 
cooperated 
Q1: What open source projects and organizations advanced _the metric_? (Can you 
describe how they helped shaped _the metric_? What was your involvement?) 
Helping each 
other 
Q1.2: How were incentives for open source projects and organizations balanced in the 
design of _the metric_? 
Imbalance 
Q1.2.1: What are typical concerns for using _the metric_? What misaligned incentives 
might _the metric_ create? 
 
Was there a question you were waiting for that I didn’t ask? Did I miss something? Any last thoughts? 
